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reporting systems is established for the transition to take place more smoothly. It is 
expected that information asymmetry can be reduced after information about R&D net 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
While most people realize the importance of Research and Development (R&D) 
activities1 in sustaining a firm’s future profitability, few can point out how much R&D 
contributes to future profitability. This is because the link between R&D activities and future 
profitability has seldom been clearly identified and reported. Most publicly available 
financial information of R&D is about the costs of R&D. Financial information about the 
benefits of R&D is not prevalent in the market. This cost-focused R&D reporting practice 
exaggerates information asymmetry between firms and the market about the value of R&D. 
As a result, the market’s valuation of R&D tends to be biased and the biased market valuation 
subsequently provides incentives for managers to make opportunistic R&D investment 
decisions. Because such decisions are often made at the cost of future profitability, the 
intrinsic value of those firms could be seriously hurt in the long run. 
The purpose of this study is to suggest one way to alleviate the negative impact of 
information asymmetry on market valuation and managerial R&D decision makings. A 
transition of the R&D reporting practice from cost focused to net benefit focused is suggested 
 
1 Formal definitions of R&D activities will be given in section 4.2.1. 
2
as one way to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry. It is expected that more 
information about the net benefit of R&D 2 will become publicly available in a net 
benefit-focused R&D reporting practice. The degree of information asymmetry can be 
reduced after more information about the net benefit of R&D becomes publicly available and 
so the related negative impacts can be alleviated. Accordingly, this study focuses on the issue 
of how to increase the amount of publicly available information about the net benefit of R&D 
and how to ensure the usefulness of such information so that the transition of the reporting 
practice can be made progress.  
The previous accounting literature on R&D implicitly suggests the need of the 
transition and suggests that the transition can take place on financial statements by altering 
R&D recognition rules. Different from what has been considered in the previous accounting 
studies on R&D, this study proposes that the transition can take place outside financial 
statements by establishing additional mandatory disclosure requirements. The reasons are 
twofold. First, because the realization of R&D net benefit is highly uncertain, the quality of 
information from financial statements can be damaged if information about the net benefit of 
R&D is recognized on financial statements. One complementary way is to disclose such 
information outside financial statements in order to maintain the quality of financial 
 
2 Formal definitions of information about the net benefit of R&D will be provided in section 4.2.6. 
3
statements. Second, it is evident that voluntary disclosures of information about the net 
benefit of R&D are not widespread in the current R&D reporting practice. An intervention of 
accounting standard-setting body is viewed as a necessary force to expedite the transition of 
the R&D reporting practice. Based on the above two reasons, a stream of two mandatory 
reporting systems, including the target reporting system and the transitional reporting system, 
outside financial statements is established and proposed as a new avenue for the transition to 
take place.  
More specifically, in the target reporting system, firms will be required to provide 
information about the expected future net benefits of R&D and information about the 
realization of net benefits of R&D. Since a firm’s future cash flow will be positively related 
to the future net benefit flow from R&D activities, the market can directly assess the firm’s 
future cash flow and price more appropriately after the target reporting system is 
implemented. Although the market can assess the potential of future cash flows more directly 
after information about future net benefits of R&D is publicly available, it may be difficult to 
force firms to provide reasonable expectations for some R&D projects. It also takes time for 
people to be accommodated to the net benefit-focused reporting practice. Although it is more 
desirable to have publicly available information about the future net benefit of R&D, the 
target reporting system may not be implemented successfully in the short run due to the 
4
above practical considerations. To initiate the transition in the short run and to make the 
process become more smoothly, a transitional reporting system is established in addition to 
the target reporting system. Firms will be required to provide only information about the 
realization of net benefits of R&D in the transitional reporting system. It is expected that the 
transitional reporting system has more potential to be implemented in the near future because 
the reporting obligation is less than that in the target reporting system. Although there will 
not be publicly available information about the future net benefit of R&D, the market can 
still be benefited by learning information about the performance of firms’ past R&D activities 
in the short run. The R&D reporting practice can be transited toward a more desirable 
reporting practice gradually. Figure 1 provides an overview of the proposed transition. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
One important issue in this study is whether useful information will be provided 
under the proposed mandatory reporting requirements. Because the realization of the net 
benefit of R&D is highly uncertain, it is unlikely to require firms to provide perfect 
information about the future net benefit of R&D. However, since managers possess superior 
information about the net benefit of R&D than the market does, information provided by 
managers, as long as has a certain level of precision, will be useful. The more precise the 
information is the more useful it will be. Therefore, it is of our interest to have some 
5
mechanism to induce more precise information from firms in the reporting system.  
Based on the findings and suggestions from Lundholm [1999, 2003], the requirement 
of disclosing historical reports about the net benefit for each R&D project3 is viewed as a 
potential mechanism to induce useful reports. Two examples are provided to demonstrate that, 
under certain circumstances, if a firm intends to misreport the future net benefit of one 
project, there will be negative impacts on the valuation of its other R&D projects when the 
precision of misreported information can be observed from the corresponding reporting 
history. Because managers are aware of the potential negative impact of providing less 
precise expectation, they will report more cautiously. In addition, the build-up credibility by 
providing more precise expectation in the history will benefit firms. It is believed that under 
the requirement of disclosing past reports for each R&D project, information with an optimal 
level of precision will be provided in equilibrium and the usefulness of information can be 
ensured to a certain extent.  
In order to present historical information more concisely, the use of diagram is 
proposed as an alternative way to disclose information. Hence, different from tabulated 
financial statements, one feature of the proposed reporting systems is that information will be 
disclosed diagrammatically. The other feature of the proposed reporting systems is that 
 
3 For the reporting purpose, information about R&D activities with identifiable and distinguishable technical 
objective will be grouped as information for one R&D project. More detail will be given in section. 4.2.2. 
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non-financial R&D information, such as the descriptions of R&D projects, physical progress 
of R&D, and the target market, etc., will not be required. It is believed that the proprietary 
cost can be restricted and the net benefit of reporting will not be damaged by the additional 
mandatory reporting requirements. It is also expected that managers will be more willing to 
supply information with higher level of precision when the proprietary cost of reporting is 
restricted4.
In addition to the alleviated negative impacts of information asymmetry, there will be 
other potential benefits if the transition can take place successfully following the proposed 
stream. Market participants will not only be benefited from the lowered information search 
cost but also from the lowered risk related to their investment decisions after more 
information about the net benefit of R&D becomes publicly available. Firms will also be 
benefited from the additional reporting requirements. Managers will be forced to participate 
in the R&D decision making process earlier and more intensively5. They will also be 
encouraged to improve their ability to handle the uncertainty related to R&D. Better 
R&D-related decisions can be made with an enhanced R&D decision making process and 
 
4 The circumstance that financial information about R&D is not prevalent in voluntary disclosure is consistent 
with proprietary theories (see, for example, Dye [1986], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], and Verrecchia [1983, 
1990a, 2001]) which suggest that firms limit their voluntary disclosure of relevant information to the financial 
market because the existence of disclosure related costs. Therefore, if proprietary costs can be restricted, firms 
may be more willing to provide more precise information. 
5 To obtain information about the net benefit of R&D, communications across departments within a firm is 
necessary. CEO plays a coordination role in communicating the needs and allocating the resources within a firm. 
The coordination process encourages CEO to get involved in R&D decision making process earlier to make 
more effective decisions (see, Roussel et al. [1991]) and in turn benefits the whole firm. 
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will benefit those firms eventually. 
The main contributions of this study are as follows. First, the direct disclosure of 
information about the net benefit of R&D has not been considered as one potential way to 
alleviate possible negative impacts of information asymmetry by the previous accounting 
literature on R&D. Prior studies focus on the issue of how to improve the usefulness of 
information about R&D costs on financial statements by examining alternative reporting 
rules6. The need for a transition of the R&D reporting practice on financial statements is 
implicitly suggested by prior studies. This study not only explicitly points out the need of the 
transition but also specifies a new direction for the transition to take place. Information 
asymmetry can be directly reduced after direct disclosures of the net benefit of R&D become 
publicly available. It is our understanding that this study is the first accounting study which 
seriously considers the direct disclosure of net benefit of R&D as a potential approach to 
transit the R&D reporting practice and to reduce negative impacts of information asymmetry.  
Second, a stream of two possible reporting systems along the path of the transition is 
established. The target reporting system is designed as an avenue for managers to provide 
 
6 One suggestion that has been made is that the current R&D financial reporting rule, which is regulated by 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (hereafter SFAS) No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development 
Costs, should be replaced by alternative reporting rules, such as capitalization or successful-efforts methods. 
There are studies provide evidence that R&D information will become more value relevant if alternative 
reporting rules are applied. This evidence implies that R&D information, when reported on financial statements, 
can be more informative under the regulation of alternative reporting rules. See section 2.2 for the related 
literature review. 
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information about R&D that can be directly associated to market valuation (i.e. the future net 
benefit of R&D). Although it has less potential to be implemented in the short run, the target 
reporting system provides a prototype of the desirable R&D reporting practice. Furthermore, 
after taking some practical considerations into account, this study suggests that a transitional 
reporting system is needed to initiate the transition process in the short run. The progress of 
transition can be made gradually with the implementation of the transitional reporting system. 
Following the established stream, it is believed that the current R&D reporting practice can 
be improved smoothly toward a more desirable R&D reporting practice. 
Finally, this study points out that there will be potential net benefits by transiting the 
R&D reporting practice in the direction suggested by this study. Market participants will be 
benefited from the reduced uncertainty of R&D and can price firms more appropriately with 
lower information search costs. Firms will be benefited from improved R&D decision 
making process. The requirement of disclosing past information also helps firms to build up 
their credibility. Firms’ reports can affect the valuation more significantly if there is higher 
build-up credibility.  
There are three main limitations of the study. First, possible impacts on social welfare 
and potential litigation costs are not examined. It is possible that imposing additional 
mandatory disclosure requirements is not always socially optimal (see, for example, Admati 
9
and Pfleiderer [2000] and Sapra [2002]). Second, the proposed mechanism in the reporting 
system cannot perfectly prevent managers from misreporting. Only the incentive for 
misreporting can be reduced. Finally, only a few practical concerns and obstacles have been 
considered in this study. It is possible that there are other practical issues related to the 
implementation of the reporting system that have not been addressed in this study. 
Because the proposed reporting requirements have not been implemented practically, 
whether the systems can work as effectively as expected remains as an open question. In the 
near future, an accounting behavioral experiment can be designed and performed to examine 
managers’ reporting behaviors and the impact of managers’ reports on the valuation of R&D 
under the proposed reporting requirements. Such a setting can provide an initial evidence of 
the feasibility of the reporting system and is considered as a possible future extension of this 
study.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background of the 
study. Chapter 3 examines issues related to the quality of information provided by firms. 
How the requirement of reporting historical information can work as a potential mechanism 
to induce useful reports and how firms will determine the optimal precision level of their 
reports will be addressed. Chapter 4 summarizes key features of the reporting requirements 
and provides formal definitions of terms that are used often throughout this study. Issues 
10 
related to the target reporting system, such as the reporting requirements, practical 
considerations, and potential benefits, are introduced in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses 
potential obstacles to the implementation of the target reporting system and introduces the 
transitional reporting system. Chapter 7 concludes the study and discusses the limitations and 
one possible future extension of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
 
2.1 Current R&D reporting practice 
It is well known that R&D activities play an important role in sustaining firms’ future 
profitability. According to the National Science Foundation (NSF), since 1953, U.S. R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP7 have ranged from a minimum of 1.4% (in 1953) to a 
maximum of 2.9% (in 1964). Most of the growth in the R&D to GDP ratio can be attributed 
to increases in nonfederal R&D spending. Nonfederal-financed R&D, the majority of which 
is financed by industry, increased from 0.6% of GDP in 1953 to an estimated 1.9% of GDP in 
2004 when R&D spending in industries has approached to 200 billion in 2004. The statistics 
demonstrate the importance of R&D in the economy and the industry. 
Although the importance of R&D activities to both individual firm and the whole 
economy is conspicuous, there is not much publicly available information about benefits and 
risks of R&D activities in the market. Current publicly available R&D financial information 
is generally restricted to cost-side information. For example, only R&D expense can be 
observed from financial statements. In the section of MD&A in annual reports often only the 
 
7 The ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP is an indicator of the intensity of R&D activity in relation to other 
economic activity and can be used to gauge a nation's commitment to R&D at different points in time (see 
National Patterns of Research and Development Resources: 2004). 
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ratio of R&D expense to Sales Revenue and the change of the ratio from past years are 
reported. The budget of R&D spending is discussed in terms of the percentage of sales but 
with no more detail. Similar reporting practices can be found when examining other 
voluntary disclosures such as press release or media report. A few examples of the current 
R&D reporting practice are given in Appendix A 
Moreover, publicly available information related to R&D benefits and risks is often 
non-financial and without explicit quantitative measures. For example, below are two 
examples that can be observed commonly from annual reports:  
--“Our long-term viability and growth will depend upon the successful development and 
commercialization of other products from our research and development activities” 
--“Product development and commercialization involve a high degree of risk. Only a small number 
of research and development programs result in the commercialization of a product.” 
The first statement indicates that benefits of R&D activities are to sustain the firm’s 
long-term viability and growth; however, how and in what degree R&D activities provide 
these benefits are not specified or measured. The other statement points out that the degree of 
risk related to R&D activities are high; however, how high the degree is not measured. The 
observations from the current R&D reporting practice suggest that firms are not used to 
disclosing quantified financial information about the performance of their R&D activities. 
One consequence is that it is difficult for interesting market participants to evaluate the 
13 
financial performance of R&D activities based on publicly available information. There will 
also not be any objective benchmark, for instance, the rate of returns on R&D investment, to 
compare the financial performance of R&D across firms. With the cost-focused R&D 
reporting practice, there will be information search costs to gather benefit-related R&D 
financial information in the market. There will also be incentives for managers to make 
opportunistic R&D decisions in the absence of an objective R&D financial performance 
evaluation standard. Previous accounting studies on R&D have addressed the consequence of 
the cost-focused R&D reporting practice and the related concerns will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
2.2 Prior Literature  
Three main concerns in the prior accounting literature on R&D are summarized to 
point out academic concerns for the current R&D financial reporting practice. The concerns 
are all centered on the rule of reporting R&D costs on financial statements. The first concern 
is the inability of the immediate expensing rule to identify the relationship between R&D 
costs and future benefits. The second concern is the potential negative impact of the 
immediate expensing rule on R&D-related decision makings. The third concern is whether 
alternative R&D reporting rules can improve the usefulness of R&D information. Each 
14 
concern will be addressed respectively below. 
The first concern is that benefits related to R&D costs have not been appropriately 
considered under the immediate expensing rule. One argument for the immediate expensing 
rule in SFAS No. 2 is that there is no direct relationship between R&D costs and future 
benefits so that R&D costs are expensed immediately when they occur. Contrary to the 
argument, R&D costs have been demonstrated to be associated with future benefits. For 
example, Sougiannis [1994] finds that one dollar outlay in R&D leads to a two dollar 
increase in earnings of the sample firms over a seven year period. Kothari et al. [2002] show 
that the contribution of current R&D expense to the variability of future earnings is three 
times greater than that of investment in property, plant and equipment.  
Additional empirical evidence about the relation between R&D costs and related 
benefits has been provided by the relation between R&D costs and stock prices. For example, 
Bublitz and Ettredge [1989], Boone and Raman [2004], Chan et. al. [1990], Duke [1976], and 
Hirshey and Weygandt [1985] find that R&D costs affect stock prices or returns. If it is true 
that the market’s expectation of firms’ future profitability is captured by stock prices, the 
positive relationship between R&D costs and stock prices implies the positive relationship 
between R&D costs and future profitability. Results from these studies are also against the 
claim of the lack of association between R&D costs and future benefits 
15 
The second concern is about the impact of the immediate expensing rule on 
managerial decision makings. Because the immediate expensing rule does not consider 
benefits of R&D costs, there is information asymmetry between firms and investors about the 
value of R&D. As Aboody and Lev [2000] indicate, because no information is required to be 
provided about the productivity and the value of R&D, the current R&D reporting practice 
exacerbates information asymmetry. In the presence of information asymmetry, management 
has incentives to manipulate its R&D decisions for different purposes. A number of studies 
have demonstrated that R&D is manipulated for managerial purposes which sometimes 
impede the firms’ future potential. For example, Duke et al. [1980], Horwitz and Kolodny 
[1980], and Wasley and Linsmeier [1992] demonstrate that firms reduce their R&D outlays 
without appropriate managerial concerns after the immediate expensing requirement was 
imposed. Baber et al. [1992], Bushee [1998], Oswald and Zarowin [2006] and Perry and 
Grinaker [1994] further provide evidence that R&D spending is managed to meet short-term 
earnings goals8.
Different circumstances that managers use R&D costs to manage earnings are also 
considered. Cheng [2004] and Dechow and Sloan [1991] examine R&D expenditure 
 
8 The incentive to meet short-term earnings goals is created when the market fixates on current earnings 
without looking beyond reported earnings by recognizing the value of R&D. Results from Boone and Raman 
[2004] and Luft and Shields [2001] suggest that when the market fixates on current earnings, equity mispricing 
is likely to occur. To avoid such mispricing, management tends to manipulate the amount of R&D spending. 
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decisions in the context of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. Their results 
indicate that there are opportunistic R&D reductions when CEOs approach retirement. In 
examining initial public offering (IPO), Darrough and Rangan [2001] find that the change of 
R&D expenditures is negatively associated with the level of managerial selling in an IPO 
which indicate that firms manage R&D earnings at the time of IPO. These studies provide 
evidence that firms manipulate R&D costs in different circumstances. 
Finally, because the immediate expensing rule does not adequately consider benefits 
from R&D activities, researchers become interested in examining the implication of 
alternative accounting rules for R&D. For example, Lev and Sougiannis [1996] explore the 
implication of the capitalization rule by estimating the R&D capital and adjusting the 
reported earnings and book value. They conclude that the R&D capitalization process yields 
value-relevant information to investors. In a simulation study for a pharmaceutical R&D 
program, Healy et al. [2002] find that capitalizing R&D outlays with the successful-efforts 
method provides a stronger relationship between accounting information and economic 
values.  
There have also been direct investigations on the impact of the capitalization rule 
from SFAS No. 86, Accounting for the Cost of Computer Software to be Sold, Leased, or 
Otherwise Marketed, which requires the capitalization of certain software development costs 
17 
incurred subsequent to establishing technological feasibility. For example, Aboody and Lev 
[1998] find that annually capitalized software development costs are positively associated 
with stock returns and software development capital assets are positively associated with 
stock prices. Mohd [2005] shows that investors’ uncertainty about the future benefits of 
software development costs is reduced when firms capitalize these costs.  
Consistent with above empirical findings, Luft and Shields [2001] suggest that 
capitalizing R&D costs affect information users’ perception on future earnings through 
experimental settings. Lev and Zarowin [1999] also call for the use of capitalization of 
certain intangibles including R&D, and systematic and continual restatement to improve 
value relevance of accounting information. 
In sum, prior accounting studies on R&D raise concerns that the immediate 
expensing rule fails to address the relationship between R&D costs and future benefits and 
exacerbating information asymmetry creates incentives for opportunistic R&D decision 
makings. Alternative R&D recognition rules, such as the capitalization or successful-efforts 
methods, have been suggested to improve the usefulness of R&D information reported on 
financial statements. These concerns demonstrate that the current R&D reporting practice on 
financial statements is not appropriate and certain improvements have to be made to alleviate 
potential negative impacts. 
18 
2.3 Motivations for additional R&D mandatory reporting requirements 
From the previous accounting literature on R&D, it is known that there are negative 
impacts of information asymmetry about the value of R&D. Such impacts can be alleviated if 
more publicly available information about the benefit of R&D activities is provided. In order 
to achieve this target, a transition from cost-focused reporting practice to net benefit-focused 
reporting practice is viewed necessary and cannot be avoided. The suggestion of altering 
R&D recognition rules on financial statements by the previous accounting literature on R&D 
also implies the need for the transition of the current R&D reporting practice. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of two possible paths of the transition of R&D 
reporting practice. The progress of the transition can be made on financial statements or on 
disclosures outside financial statements. The prior accounting literature on R&D implicitly 
suggests that the progress of the transition can be made by altering recognition rules of R&D 
related information on financial statements. For example, the reporting practice under the 
immediate expensing rule is cost focused and the reporting practice under the capitalization 
rule is more benefit focused. The suggestion that the reporting rule of R&D is switched from 
the immediate reporting rule to the capitalization rule implies that the transition can take 
place on financial statements.  
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
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Different from the focus of the prior literature, this study suggests that the transition 
can take place on disclosures outside financial statements. A set of additional mandatory 
reporting requirements for managers to disclose information outside financial statements is 
established and considered as an approach to make progress of the transition. The reasons are 
twofold. First, the observation that voluntary disclosures of information about benefits of 
R&D are not widespread in practice suggests that managers are reluctant to disclose such 
information when there is no mandatory reporting requirement. Without an intervention of 
accounting standard-setting body, it will be difficult to shift the R&D reporting practice from 
cost focused to benefit focused. A force from the standard-setting body is necessary for the 
transition to take place. Hence, setting up mandatory reporting requirements for managers to 
report information about the benefit of R&D activities is considered as a more effective 
approach. 
Second, it is possible that the transition can be completed on financial statements in 
the future. For instance, recognizing the deficiency of the immediate expensing rule, not only 
the U.S. but also some foreign countries have allowed the capitalization of R&D costs under 
certain conditions9. It is possible that the accounting standard of R&D will be revised 
 
9 For instance, U.K. accounting principle for R&D cost (SSAP No. 13) permits the capitalization and 
subsequent amortization of development expenditures if (1) there is a clearly defined project; (2) the related 
expenditure is separately identifiable; (3) the outcome of the project has been assessed with reasonable certainty; 
(4) the aggregate of deferred development costs, and other related costs is reasonably expected to be exceeded 
by related future sales or other revenues; and (5) adequate resources exist, or are reasonably expected to be 
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following the trend of fair value accounting10 so that the net benefit of R&D activities can be 
recognized on financial statements in the future. Altering the R&D recognition rule on 
financial statement indeed is one feasible way to transit the R&D reporting practice. 
However, it should be noted that the transition of the R&D reporting practice by 
altering recognition rules on financial statements has its own deficiency. Because R&D 
activities involve a great degree of uncertainty, it is likely that firms will need to revise the 
reported net benefit of R&D on financial statements frequently. It can be expected that the 
frequent revision will cause a greater degree of variability of information on financial 
statements. As a result, financial statements reflect not only results from economic activities 
but also the change of uncertainty from reporting the net benefit of R&D. The quality of 
information on financial statements could therefore be damaged if the net benefit of R&D is 
recognized on financial statements.  
One complementary way to prevent the information quality of financial statements 
from being damaged is to disclose such information in a separate disclosure outside financial 
statements. On the one part, the information quality of financial statements will not be 
 
available. International Accounting Standards (IAS) allows the capitalization of development costs only after 
technical and commercial feasibility of the asset for sale or use have been established (IAS 38). Finally, 
Australian Accounting Standard AASB No. 1011 indicates that “Costs incurred during the financial year on a 
research and development project shall be deferred to future years to the extent that such costs, together with 
unamortized deferred costs in relation to that project, are expected beyond any reasonable doubt to be 
recoverable.” 
10 Currently, some accounting subjects have been recognized and reported according to fair value. Trading 
securities and purchased intangible assets are two examples of the application of fair value accounting. 
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affected by the uncertainty of R&D net benefits. On the other part, information about the net 
benefit of R&D can still be learned by market participants from a separate disclosure outside 
financial statements. Hence, unlike prior accounting studies, this study considers reporting 
R&D benefits in a separate disclosure outside financial statements as a better approach.  
Additional mandatory reporting systems outside financial statements are established 
for firms to report information about the net benefit of R&D based on the above two reasons. 
A stream of two reporting systems is developed along the path of the transition and is 
highlighted in the shaded boxes in Figure 2. The target reporting system has desirable 
features but may not be feasible in the short run. The transitional reporting system is then 
established as a buffer in the transition. Details of the proposed mandatory R&D reporting 
systems will be examined in later chapters. 
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Chapter 3: The quality of useful R&D information 
 
As mentioned earlier, this study looks for ways to improve the valuation of R&D and 
to reduce incentives for opportunistic R&D decision makings. Mandating managers to report 
information about the net benefit of R&D in a separate disclosure outside financial 
statements is proposed as one potential way to reduce negative impacts of information 
asymmetry. Since the design of the reporting system (or the reporting requirements) will 
affect managers’ reporting behaviors and in turn affect the quality of information provided by 
managers, it is crucial to first consider the impact of managers’ potential reporting behaviors 
on the quality of information and further adapt the design of the reporting system to ensure 
the quality of information provided by managers.  
In this chapter, the quality for R&D information provided by firms to be useful is first 
identified. Requiring managers to report their past reports for each R&D projects is viewed as 
a potential mechanism to induce managers to provide useful information about the future net 
benefit of R&D. Under such requirement, how managers’ reporting behaviors affect 
information quality and the market’s valuation of R&D will then be examined in two 
examples. The optimal reporting decision will be addressed at the end of this chapter.  
23 
3.1 The quality of information about the net benefit of R&D  
In this section, the usefulness of information about the net benefit of R&D will be 
first identified and the quality for such information to be useful will then be examined. 
3.1.1 The usefulness of information about the net benefit of R&D  
Information about the net benefit of R&D will affect both the valuation of R&D and 
the incentive for opportunistic R&D decision makings only when it is used. Its usefulness 
depends on the degree of this impact; the higher the impact the more useful the information. 
To highlight the impact of R&D information, an example is provided as follows. Consider a 
situation when a firm’s future net benefit flow totally comes from its R&D activities and its 
earnings equal to the net benefit of R&D. To maintain earnings flow, it is necessary for the 
firm to fund R&D activities every year. Further assume that the market valuation of the firm 
is based on the expected future earnings flow so that the higher expected earnings the higher 
the market valuation.  
The impact of information about the future net benefit of R&D on the market 
valuation and the managerial decision making are analyzed in three scenarios listed in Table 
1. In scenario 1, the firm currently has earnings $80 and it is expected that the $80 will be 
persistent in the future as long as the firm continues spending $20 in its R&D activities in 
each year. In scenario 1, the expected future earnings flow will be $80 per year, and the 
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market valuation of the firm will be made according to the expected future earnings flow.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Assume that the manager is considering whether to spend an additional $10 on R&D 
annually beginning in the current year. The manager privately observes that the increase of 
$10 in R&D will create $30 more earnings annually beginning next year. In other words, the 
net benefit flow from the additional R&D expenditure is $20 per year beginning next year.  
In scenario 2, it is assumed that there is no publicly available information about the 
net benefit of the additional R&D expenditure. Earnings in current year will be reduced to 
$70 after the additional $10 R&D cost is spent. Since current earnings are expected to be 
persistent in the future, the expected future earnings flow will be revised to $70 per year. The 
market valuation of the firm will be made according to $70 expected future earnings flow. As 
a result, the market valuation of the firm at the end of current year in scenario 2 will be lower 
than that in scenario 1.  
The situation differs when additional information about the net benefit of the 
additional R&D spending is disclosed. In scenario 3, assume that the manager reports his 
private information about the future net benefit of R&D to the market. After recognizing that 
there will be $20 increase of the future net benefit flow from the additional $10 R&D cost, 
the market will adjust its expectation of the firm’s future earnings flow into $100 (i.e. 
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(100+30)-(20+10)) per year instead of using current earnings as the basis to estimate future 
earnings flow. The market valuation at the end of current period in scenario 3 will hence be 
higher than that in scenario 1 and scenario 2. 
Because the market valuation in scenario 2 is the lowest, the manager, when he cares 
only about the current market value and when he does not want to disclose his private 
information, would drop the chance of getting more earnings and stay in scenario 1. 
Apparently, this decision is opportunistic because it is not made to maximize the firm’s 
economic value. The incentive is created because the market does not have information about 
the link between the incremental R&D costs and related future net benefits, and values the 
firm’s future earnings flow inappropriately. When the market is provided with information 
about the future net benefit of the additional R&D costs and corrects its valuation 
accordingly (i.e. in scenario 3), the manager will spend $10 on R&D. The opportunistic R&D 
decision making will not be necessary.  
 From the above example, it can be seen that when information about the future net 
benefit of R&D is disclosed, the market valuation will be less biased and the incentive for 
opportunistic decision makings can be reduced. The higher the impact the more useful 
information provided by managers.   
 
26 
3.1.2 The quality of useful R&D information 
As discussed in the above section, the usefulness of information about the future net 
benefit of R&D is determined by its impact on market valuation and on R&D-related 
decision makings. The degree of the impact will mainly depend on the degree of how much 
reported information is being used, which in turn is determined by the degree of the quality 
of reported information. In other words, information with better quality will be used more 
and have greater impact. 
There are different dimensions of information quality. For example, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, 
defines the primary accounting information qualities as reliability and relevance, and the 
secondary information qualities as comparability and consistency. Information about the net 
benefit of R&D is viewed as part of accounting information and hence its quality can be 
measured according to these dimensions. However, since the realization of the net benefit of 
R&D often involves with a great amount of uncertainties, not all dimensions of the quality of 
historical accounting information, especially the reliability, can be applied appropriately.  
Instead of following dimensions of accounting information quality, the emphasis of the 
quality of information about the future net benefit of R&D will be put on the precision of 
information in this study. More specifically, the quality is viewed to be higher if its precision 
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is (or is perceived to be) higher. The usefulness of information increases when the precision 
increases. To see this point clearly, it is known that the relative precision of two signals 
affects the valuation weight that will be put on each signal from the disclosure theory (e.g. 
Verrecchia [2001]). Denote a normally distributed random variable, k, as a firm’s future cash 
flow with mean 
_
k and variance 1−g . The distribution of x is public information. For 
simplicity, assume that the firm’s future cash flow equals to the future net benefit of its R&D. 
The firm is required to provide information about the net benefit of R&D to the market. The 
report issued by the firm is denoted as r and the precision of the report is u. The conditional 
expected future cash flow when r is disclosed and when u is known by the market is as 
follows: 
_
)1(],|[ xrrkE ⋅−+⋅= βββ ,
where β is the relative precision of r and x , and )/( guu +=β .
It can be observed that the firm’s report will have a greater impact on the conditional 
expected future cash flow when more weights are put on it. The greater the impact the more 
useful the firm’s report. The weight depends on the relative precision of the firm’s report. As 
long as there is a certain degree of precision of the firm’s report (i.e. 0≠β ), information 
provided by the firm will be useful because it will affect the market’s expectation of the 
firm’s future cash flow. The usefulness increases in the precision; therefore, when the firm’s 
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report has no precision at all, it is useless and will not be used. On the contrary, managers can 
improve the impact of their reports on the market valuation by offering more precise 
information.  
Above is the case when the precision of the firm’s report is observable at the time when 
the market valuation is made. In real life, the precision of a firm’s report can only be 
observed ex post. The inability of market participants to observe the precision ex ante creates 
incentives for managers to misreport. Accordingly, how to reduce such incentives so that 
managers will be encouraged to provide more useful information is a crucial issue when 
designing the proposed reporting system. The issue will be addressed with more details in the 
next section. 
 
3.2 A potential mechanism to induce reports with quality 
As mentioned in the previous section, information provided by managers, as long as 
with a certain level of precision, will be useful in assisting the market’s valuation of R&D. 
Hence, how to induce managers to provide information with a certain level of precision is a 
crucial issue. Lundholm [1999] suggests that ex post reporting of accuracy of a firm’s prior 
estimates can improve the incentive for firms to makes more accurate estimates ex ante. He 
[2003] further shows how accounting reports about the past can lend credibility to a firm’s 
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more timely discretionary disclosures. This study extends his works and considers the 
requirement of disclosing managers’ past expectations as well as the realization of their 
expectations as a potential mechanism to induce managers to provide information with a 
certain level of precision.  
The potential mechanism works when historical information about the net benefit of 
each R&D project is disclosed separately. When the net benefit of one project is fully realized, 
the precision of information provided by management regarding the future net benefit of the 
project will be revealed from the reporting history. The market will use the realized precision 
to update its belief of the precisions of management’s expectations of other projects. The 
updated perceived precision of management’s expectation will then be used to value those 
projects. The higher the realized precision, the more the market will trust managers’ reports 
and the more managers’ expectation will affect the market’s valuation. In other words, the 
credibility of managers’ report will be built up by the realized precisions and will affect the 
market’s valuation.  
Because there will be benefits from the build-up credibility, it is not always 
worthwhile for managers to provide less precise expectations. The incentive for managers to 
provide imprecise expectations can therefore be restricted after considering the related 
potential impacts. Since the realized precisions can be observed from managers’ past reports 
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about their expectations of the future net benefit of R&D, it is expected that the requirement 
of disclosing historical information for each R&D project can work as a potential mechanism 
to induce managers to provide more precise expectations. 
In this section, two examples are provided to show how managers’ past reporting 
decisions affect the realized precision and in turn affect the valuation of R&D under the 
requirement of reporting historical information. The first example illustrates how the realized 
precision of expectation about the future net benefit of one project affects the perceived 
precision of expectation about the future net benefit of the other project from a theoretical 
viewpoint. It demonstrates that, under certain reasonable conditions, the intended 
over-(under-)statement of the net benefit of one project will negatively affect the evaluation 
of the other project. The potential negative impacts come from the loss of credibility. 
Intuitively, managers will report more cautiously after taking such impacts into account. A 
numerical example is further provided to illustrate the impact of managers’ past reporting 
decisions on the realized precision and the market’s valuation more realistically. The optimal 
reporting decision after taking into account such impacts will be examined in the next 
section.  
Before proceeding to the examples, definitions of notations that will be used in the 




: Publicly available information about the net benefit of R&D project i; it is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
_
x and variance 1−h
iy : The manager’s private information about the net benefit of R&D project i; it is 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 
_
x and variance 1−u
ir : Reported net benefit of R&D project i; iii yr ε+=
iε : The manipulation error included in the report for R&D project i
h: The precision of the publicly available information about the net benefit of R&D 
project  
ui: The precision of manager’s private information about the net benefit of R&D 
project i
iρ : The precision of reported information from managers ir ; )/(
2
ii uvuv ερ +=
0ρ : The market’s initial belief of the precision of managers’ report 
E( iρ ): The perceived precision of reported information by the market 
iβ : The relative precision of publicly available information and manager’s report 
about the net benefit of project i
iV : The market’s valuation of R&D project i;
)( iVE : The expected market’s valuation of R&D project i
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3.2.1 A theoretical example 
Assume that a firm undertakes two R&D projects in different periods. Each R&D 
project is assumed to have similar amounts of net benefit and similar amount of risk but with 
distinguishable technical objective. The second project is launched one period later than the 
first project. The net benefits from two R&D projects are normally distributed random 
variables 2,1,
~
=ixi with mean 
_
x and variance 1−h , and the distribution is public 
information. It takes two periods for the net benefits to be realized. Before the launch of each 
R&D project, management of the firm has private information about the realization of 
~
x . Its 
private information is denoted as 2,1, =iyi and is normally distributed with mean 
_
x and 
variance 1−u . Because management possesses superior information about the net benefits of 
R&D projects, it is assumed that 1−u < 1−h (i.e. management’s private information contains 
smaller variance than the market’s information).  
Assume that management is required to report its expectation about the future net 
benefit of R&D projects based on its private information at the end of the first period after 
each project is launched. Management’s report for each project is denoted as 2,1, =iri . The 
net benefit of each R&D project will be fully realized at the end of the second period after its 
launch. The event and related information are summarized in Figure 3. 
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
Because the market cannot observe management’s private information directly, 
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whether management provides information based on its private information is unknown to 
the market. Hence, it is possible for management to misreport11. Let iii yr ε+= , where iε
is the manipulated noise that can be controlled by the management and cannot be observed 
by the market. Assume that the variance of the report increases as iε increases, and is 
expressed as 211)var( ii vur ε
−− += . When management misreports, the variance of the report 
will increase in the squared noises. The precision is defined as the reciprocal of variances so 
that h, u , and )/( 2ii uvuv ερ += are precisions of 
~
x , iy , and ir respectively. Adding 
more noises in the report will decrease the precision of the report.  
The market does not know the precision of management’s expectation at the time 
when it receives management’s report but it is assumed that the market will know that after 
the net benefit is fully realized. In other words, the precision of 1r is assumed to be observed 
by the market at t=2 and the precision of 2r can be observed at t=3. Before the realization 
of the precision of 1r , it is assumed that the market’s prior belief of the precision of 
management’s report is 0ρ . After receiving 1r , the market forms its belief of the precision 
of 1r based on its prior belief. Its belief of the precision of 1r is denoted as 001 )|( ρρρ =E .
At t=2, after the precision of 1r is realized and becomes observable, the market updates its 
 
11 In this example, the decision to acquire more precise information is not considered in order to concentrate on 
the impact of intended misreport. It is also possible for managers to acquire and report more precise information. 
Such possibility will be considered in the optimal reporting decision, which will be addressed in section 3.3. 
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belief of the precision of 2r based on the realized precision of 1r and its prior belief, and 
the updated perceived precision level of 2r is denoted as 01012 )1(),|( ρρρρρ ccE −+=
12.
The market values R&D projects based on its expectation of the net benefit of each 
project and its risk tolerance. Following the notation used by Kanodia and Lee [1998], the 
market valuation of each project iV can be denoted as: 
1)1()1( −
−
−−−+= hxrV iiiii βλββ , (1) 
where iβ is the weight the market places on management’s report, λ is the degree of risk 
aversion, and 1)1( −− hβλ is the discount of risk. The higher λ is the more risk discount 
the market will adjust from the expected value of the project. iβ depends on the relative 
precision of ir and the market’s prior belief and can be expressed as: )/( 001 h+= ρρβ
and ])1(/[])1([ 01012 hcccc +−+−+= ρρρρβ . Let Acc =−+ 01 )1( ρρ so that 
)/(2 hAA +=β .
To focus on the impact of management’s reporting decision on the evaluation of R&D 
projects, it is assumed that management’s utility increases in the market’s valuation of R&D 
projects so that management prefers having higher market valuation of R&D. The decision 
whether to add noises will depend on the impact of the noises on the expected market 
valuation of each R&D project, )( iVE . Since the focus here is how the ex post realization of 
 
12 The weight c is selected by the market and is taken as given when examining management’s decision.  
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precision level affects the ex ante reporting behavior, I focus on management’s decision at 
t=1. In other words, the issue of concern is to show how management chooses 1ε (and thus 
1ρ ) at t=1 when it knows that the realization of 1ρ at t=2 will affect the market’s belief of 
2ρ (and thus affects )( 2VE ).  
The marginal impact of 1ε on )( 1VE and )( 2VE given management’ private 




































vcuVE . (3) 13 
The impact of 1ε on )( 1VE is a positive constant. The increase of 1ε increases the 
market evaluation by )/( 00 h+ρρ ; therefore, without considering the potential impact 
on )( 2VE , management will prefer adding more positive noises to increase )( 1VE . However, 
from equation (3), the impact of 1ε on the second project’s expected valuation equals to 
zero only when 01 =ε or when )/(2 hxy λ−=
−
. In other words, management should 
consider not only the impact of 1ε on )( 1VE but also that on )( 2VE when neither 01 =ε
nor )/(2 hxy λ−=
−
. When the impact of 1ε on )( 2VE is considered, management will find 
 
13 Management observes 2y at t=1 so that he will use 2y as the basis to estimate the market’s evaluation of 
the second project. Hence 2r is replaced by 2y in the equation. 
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out that it is not always optimal to add positive noises in 1r as discussed below.  
First, it can be seen from equation (3) that the sign of 12 /)( ε∂∂ VE depends on the 
sign of 1ε and that of ])([ 2 λ+−
−
xyh . When the sign of 1ε is consistent with the sign of 
])([ 2 λ+−
−
xyh , the impact from adding more noises on )( 2VE will be negative. For 
example, if management privately observes that net benefit of the second project is greater 
than the mean market valuation (i.e. )/(2 hxy λ−>
−
), and if he considers to add positive 
noises (i.e. 1ε > 0), then )( 2VE will be decreasing in 1ε . This implies that the smaller the 
positive noise (i.e. less positive) the less negative impact on )( 2VE . Contrarily, when 
)/(2 hxy λ−<
−
, adding more positive noise will have more positive impact on )( 2VE . The 
observation from the result is summarized below: 
Observation 1. When )/(2 hxy λ−>
−
, adding more positive noise will have more 
negative impact on )( 2VE ; Contrarily, when )/(2 hxy λ−<
−
, adding more 
positive noise will have more positive impact on )( 2VE .
The implication of observation 1 is that, the overstatement of expectation in the first 
report will have negative impacts on the valuation of the second project when management 
privately observes that the net benefit of the second project will be greater than the mean 
market valuation. Only when the expected net benefit of the second project is less than the 
mean market valuation will the overstatement have positive impacts on the valuation of the 
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second project. )( 2VE will be better off if ),|( 012 ρρρE is lowered and the market puts 
more weight on its prior mean, which is higher than the net benefit of the second project.  
The result is intuitive because it shows that when management prefers 2r receiving 
more weight in the valuation of the second project, it will provide more precise expectation 
in 1r . On the contrary, management has incentive to misreport its private information when it 
privately observes that the net benefit of the second project is bad (i.e. )/(2 hxy λ−<
−
) and it 
prefers less weight (i.e. smaller 2β ) of its report in valuing the second project. To reduce the 
weight on its report, management will be induced to include 1ε in 1r to decrease 1ρ ,
which will in turn decrease ),|( 012 ρρρE . The optimal amount of noise will be determined 
by setting 0)/)(()/)(( 1211 =∂∂+∂∂ εε VEVE when management’s objective is to maximize 





From the above example it can be seen that when the market can observe the 
realization of 1ρ , it is not always optimal for management to misreport after considering the 
potential impact of the second project’s market valuation. When it is expected that 
subsequent R&D projects will have net benefits greater than the mean market expected net 
benefit, the noise added in the previous reports will only damage the valuation of the 
subsequent projects. By requiring management to report the history of its expectations as 
well as the realization of its expectation, management will be induced to consider the 
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potential impact of the realized precision of its past reports on the valuation of subsequent 
R&D projects. Hence, the requirement of reporting historical information is viewed as a 
potential mechanism to reduce incentives for misreporting and to ensure certain level of 
precision of management’s report. 
 
3.2.2 A numerical example 
In the above example, the decision management faces is quite simple: it only needs to 
consider the impact of one report of the first project on the evaluation of the second project. 
In practice, the major part of net benefit of an R&D project often can be realized after several 
years. Hence, there will be several chances for management to update its expectation for the 
same project (i.e. multiple reports for one project). The situation in real life will be more 
complicate than what has been modeled. Below I use a numerical example to illustrate more 
realistically how different reporting behaviors affect the realized precision of information that 
has been reported for one project and in turn affects the perceived precision of information 
reported for another project. 
Consider a situation when it takes three periods for the net benefit of an R&D project to 
be realized and management will need to report its private information about the future net 
benefit of R&D of this project as well as the realization of the net benefit at the end of each 
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reporting period. The net benefit of the project will be realized at the end of the third 
reporting period so that management can only misreport information in the first two reports. 
In order to emphasize how different reporting behaviors, especially when managers intend to 
misreport, will affect the realized precision, it is assumed that management has very precise 
private information. Further assume that management privately observes that the realization 
of the net benefit of the project will be $100 before it undertakes the project (i.e. at the 
beginning of the first reporting period) and its private information remains unchanged 
throughout the three reporting periods.  
In the first report, management can report its expectation in one of three ways: it can 
report its private information truthfully (i.e. report $100), overstate its private information 
(e.g. report $125), or understate its private information (e.g. report $75). In the second report, 
it has four choices: report an amount equal to what it reported in the first report, report its 
private information truthfully, overstate or understate its private information. Figure 4 lists 12 
different patterns of reporting behavior and each is assigned with a case number (i.e. the 
number in the parenthesis). Market participants cannot observe management’s private 
information and they don’t know the precision of management’s expectations in the first two 
accounting period. However, after the net benefit is fully realized at the end of the third 
period, the precision of management’s report will be known.  
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 Under the assumption that the realized net benefit at the end of the third reporting 
period is $101 (i.e. management must report $101 regardless of its previous reporting 
behaviors), the realized precision in each case is listed at the end of each reporting behavior 
in Figure 4. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
It can be observed clearly that the reporting behavior in case 2-2 and case 2-3 have the 
highest realized precisions. The two cases represent the same reporting behavior when 
management reports its private information truthfully throughout the reporting periods. The 
second highest precisions are obtained when management overstates in only one report (case 
1-3 and 2-1). The third highest precisions are when management understates in only one 
report (case 2-4 and 3-2). The lowest precision is obtained when management understates in 
the first report and further understates in the second report (case 3-4). From the example, it is 
clear to see that different reporting behaviors end up with different realized precisions 
After observing the realized precision of information provided by management 
regarding the net benefit of the project, the market will update its belief of the precision of 
information provided by management regarding the future net benefit of a subsequent project. 
Using the same definition and notations in the theoretical example, the updated perceived 
precision level is a weighted average of the market’s prior belief of the precision of 
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management’s report, i.e. 01 )1( ρρ cc −+ , where c is the weight determined by the market. 
Table 2 lists the updated perceived precision for each case under different assumptions of 0ρ
and c. It is assumed that the market has a lower prior perceived level of precision of 
information provided by management in scenario 1 ( 0ρ =0.001) than in scenario 2 ( 0ρ =0.005). 
In each case, three weights are given (c=0.3, 0.5 and 0.7) for comparison. The higher the 
weight, the more the realized precision affects the updated perceived precision level.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The updated perceived precision level will then be applied to value the subsequent 
project. Assume that the market values R&D projects according to equation (1) in the prior 
section and assume that the reported net benefit for the other project equals to $150 (i.e. 
1502 =r ) and the prior distribution of the net benefit has mean equals to $100 (i.e. 100=
−
x )
and variance equals to 333 (i.e. 1−h = 333). Further assume that the market’s risk aversion 
equals to 0.002 (i.e. 002.0=λ ). Table 3 lists the market’s valuation of the R&D project. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
It can be found that only when the realized precision is high will the valuation of the 
subsequent project closes to management’s current report. Because the mean of the net 
benefit is lower than what management reports in this case (i.e. 2rx <
−
), the decrease of the 
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weight on management’s report will decrease the valuation of the project14. The decrease of 
the valuation can be viewed as the cost of misreporting in prior reports. Because of the 
potential costs arising from misreporting, it is not always worthwhile for management to 
provide less precise expectations. The observation is the same as observation 1 in the 
theoretical example. Both the theoretical example and the numerical example demonstrate 
that it is not always optimal for management to provide imprecise expectation when what it 
reported in the past will be disclosed and the realized precision of its previous reports can be 
observed. 
 
3.3 The optimal reporting decision 
The above examples illustrate how managers’ past reporting decisions would affect 
the realized precision and the valuation of subsequent R&D projects if their past reports were 
required to be reported. The requirement of disclosing the reporting history will force 
managers to consider the impact of their reporting behaviors on the valuation of subsequent 
R&D projects. The impact on the market’s valuation of R&D will be higher when more 
precise reports are observed. In addition, the market’s valuation of R&D when more precise 
reports are provided will be less biased and the perceived risk will also be reduced. Firms 
 
14 The situation reverses when the management’s report is lower than prior mean. In this case, the market 
valuation will increase when the weight on management’s report decreases.  
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will be benefited from the improved market valuation more when their reports affect the 
valuation more. The optimal precision level will be determined after such benefits are 
considered.  
More specifically, the optimal reporting decision will be determined by maximizing 
the net benefit of reporting, which depends on the related benefits and costs. The potential 
benefit of disclosing more precise information about the net benefit of R&D comes from the 
improved market valuation: the valuation of R&D will be less biased and the risk discount 
will also be reduced. From equation (1), it is known that the valuation of R&D will be 
affected by the precision of managers’ reports and the benefit of providing information with a 





−− +−=+−= hxrhxrB λββλβρ . (4) 
||
_
xr − in equation (4) represents the absolute value of the improved market 
expectation about the future net benefit of R&D, and 1−hλ represents the amount of risk 
discount. β represents the relative precision of managers’ reports and the market’s prior 
information and it can be further denoted as )/( h+ρρ , where ρ represents the precision 
of managers’ reports and h represents the precision of the market’s prior information. In 
general, )|(| 1
_
−+− hxr λβ represents the benefit of the improved market valuation when 
managers’ reports have a certain level of precision. When more precise information is 
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provided, the market’s expectation about the net benefit of R&D will be improved and be less 
biased. The risk discount from the uncertainty of the R&D net benefit will also be reduced. 
The amount of benefit will depend on β . The higher β is the greater the benefit is. 
Furthermore, the benefit of the improved market valuation increases at a decreasing rate with 
ρ because 0)( >′ ρB and 0)( <′′ ρB (i.e. the benefit function will be concave down). The 
benefit of providing information with different levels of precision can be depicted as line A in 
Figure 5.  
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
When past reports are disclosed, the market will be able to observe the precision of 
managers’ reports about the expected net benefit of R&D eventually. As a result, β will be 
greater when more precise information has been provided in equilibrium. Consequently, the 
benefit of providing rough guess will be lower than that of providing perfect expectation. In 
addition, the marginal benefit from providing more precise information will become smaller 
and smaller. The maximum benefit when perfect information is provided (i.e. when β
approaches 1) will be equal to 1
_
|| −+− hxr λ .
On the other hand, different reporting decisions accompany different amounts of cost. 
Line B in Figure 5 represents the cost of providing information, including the information 
gathering cost and the proprietary cost. The cost will also be increasing with the precision 
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level. For instance, rough guesses can be made without any information searching cost and 
they will not provide any competitive advantage to competitors so that the proprietary cost 
will also be low. More costs will be spent in order to get more precise expectations about the 
net benefits of R&D. For example, managers will have to spend more costs to evaluate the 
probability of success, to measure the market demand, or to study the trend of the industry or 
the whole economy in order to improve the precision of their expectations. The proprietary 
cost will also increase when more precise information is provided. Competitors can take 
advantage of using more precise information from one firm and the relative competitive 
advantages of the firm will be damaged more seriously. In addition, the cost to provide 
perfect expectation will be infinite since it is unlikely to perfectly foresee the future. The cost 
will therefore increase at an increasing rate with β and will have a concave-up functional 
form as depicted in line B.  
The net benefit of providing information with different levels of precision equals to the 
difference of the benefit and the cost. Based on Figure 5, the net benefit can be depicted in 
Figure 6. Because both the benefit and the cost of providing imprecise information are low, 
the net benefit of providing imprecise information will be low. Furthermore, since the benefit 
function will be concave down and the cost function will be concave up, the net benefit will 
be positive on some interval. The net benefit will be zero when the cost equals to the 
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maximum amount of the benefit, 1
_
|| −+− hxr λ . In equilibrium, firms’ optimal reporting 
decisions will be determined when the net benefit is maximized. Firms will report 
information with precision level *ρ to receive the maximized amount of net benefit. 
(Insert Figure 6 about here) 
Under the proposed reporting requirements, the net benefit of disclosing required 
information will be affected by managers’ credibility. Providing more precise information in 
the past can build up managers’ credibility and will create more benefits in the future. 
Contrarily, providing imprecise information in the past can damage the credibility of 
managers’ reports and will affect the market’s valuation less significantly. Since managers’ 
past reporting behaviors will be observed by the market eventually, managers will be forced 
to consider the impact of their reporting behaviors on their credibility. The requirement of 
reporting past information thus not only reduces the incentive of misreporting but also 
highlights the benefit of providing more precise information. In the long run, managers will 
realize the benefit of providing more precise information about the net benefit of R&D and 
will also be less against the additional mandatory reporting requirement. 
In short, information provided by managers about the net benefit of R&D will be 
useful as long as it has a certain level of precision. The requirement of disclosing past reports 
for each R&D project is viewed as a potential mechanism to induce more precise reports 
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from managers. It further encourages managers to consider the benefit of the build-up 
credibility by providing more precise expectation. In equilibrium, firms will be induced to 
provide information with an optimal precision level. Such information will benefit not only 
market participants but also firms from the improved market valuation.  
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Chapter 4: Key features and definitions of terms 
 
Before proceeding to details of the reporting systems, two key features of the 
reporting requirements and formal definitions of terms used often in this study will first be 
addressed in this chapter. Reporting requirements in the target reporting system and the 
transitional reporting system will be examined in chapter 5 and chapter 6 respectively. 
 
4.1 Key features of the reporting requirements 
In chapter 3, it has been discussed that the design of the reporting system should have 
embedded mechanisms that can induce useful reports from firms. The reporting requirements 
are therefore developed with attempts to create such mechanisms. Two features of the 
reporting requirements are created accordingly and can be observed in both the target 
reporting system and the transitional reporting system.  
First, not only current but also past reports will be disclosed. As mentioned in chapter 
3, the requirement of disclosing historical information is viewed as a potential mechanism to 
reduce incentives for reporting imprecise information. Hence, what managers have reported 
in the past is required to be disclosed in the current report. Because R&D activities are 
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long-term activities, there could be historical information for several periods in one single 
report for each R&D project. In additional to disclosing historical information in tables, the 
use of diagrams is considered as an alternative way to present historical information more 
concisely. Both managers’ reporting behaviors and the change of information about the net 
benefit of R&D over time can be observed from diagrams easier. This study hence focuses on 
illustrating how to report information diagrammatically15.
Second, managers’ private R&D information is quantified and will be reported in 
numbers16. As discussed in chapter 3, the optimal reporting strategy depends on the net 
benefit of reporting. To improve the willingness of firms to provide more precise information, 
the net benefit of reporting such information must be positive. One way to improve the net 
benefit is to reduce the potential proprietary cost by restricting the amount of proprietary 
information in the proposed manadatory disclosure. Non-financial R&D information, such as 
the description of projects, the physical progress, the expected time to launch 
commercialization, and the market target, etc., is often confidential and associated with 
higher disclosure costs. The proprietary cost could be inevitably huge if such information 
were reported. One potential consequence is that managers will provide useless information 
 
15 In addition to reporting the required information in tables or diagrams, managers can provide their 
explanations in the disclosures if necessary. 
16 Although private information is summarized in numbers, managers are still required to provide statements to 
briefly explain any change of information or to provide necessary supplemental information. 
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to avoide the proprietary costs. It is believed that the amount of proprietary cost can be 
restricted if only financial numbers are reported. In this way, firms will be more willing to 
provide useful information and the implementation of the reporting systems will be more 
feasible.  
 
4.2 Formal definitions of terms 
Formal definitions of terms that used frequently in this study, including R&D activities, 
R&D projects, R&D costs, returns on R&D costs, the net benefit of R&D, and information 
about the net benefit of R&D, are defined separately below. 
4.2.1 R&D activities  
R&D activities are defined according to SFAS No. 2: 
“Research is planned search or critical investigation aimed at discovery of new knowledge 
with the hope that such knowledge will be useful in developing a new product or service 
(hereafter “product”) or a new process or technique (hereafter “process”) or in bringing about a 
significant improvement to an existing product or process. 
Development is the translation of research findings or other knowledge into a plan or 
design for a new product or process or for a significant improvement to an existing product or 
process whether intended for sale or use. It includes the conceptual formulation, design, and 
testing of product alternative, construction of prototypes, and operation of pilot plants. It does 
not include routine or periodic alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing 
processes, and other on-going operations even though those alterations may represent 
improvements and it does not include market research or market testing activities.” 
The objective of R&D activities is called the technical objective in this study. 
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According to the above definition, the technical objective can generally be identified by 
product, process, or design. R&D activities are undertaken to fulfill their technical objectives. 
The technical objective is fulfilled when the target product, process, or design is created. The 
target product, process or design is called the technical output from R&D activities.  
4.2.2 R&D projects 
It is often that firms have R&D activities with different technical objectives at the 
same time. For the reporting purpose, information about R&D activities with identifiable and 
distinguishable technical objective will be grouped as information for one R&D project. An 
R&D project is technically finished when its technical objective is accomplished and the 
technical output is generated (for example, when the product prototype is established). In 
addition to technical objectives, R&D projects often have immediate commercial objectives17 
or specific application plans. Commercial objectives can be defined by returns, market share, 
or growth rate. An R&D project is commercially accomplished when its commercial 
objective is fulfilled and there will not be any further commercial benefits. Similarly, the 
application plan is accomplished when the technical result is applied. The life of an R&D 
project ends when both its technical and commercial objectives are fulfilled and no more 
related benefits or costs. 
 
17 Not all R&D projects have immediate commercial objectives. For example, according to the definition by 
NSF, basic research is defined as research that advances scientific knowledge but does not have specific 
immediate commercial objectives.   
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4.2.3 R&D costs 
R&D costs are costs directly associated with R&D activities in each accounting 
period. They are necessary costs to accomplish the technical objectives of R&D projects. 
Elements of costs to be identified with R&D activities as defined in paragraph 11 of SFAS 
No.2 include materials, equipment, and facilities, personnel, intangibles purchased from 
others, contract services, and indirect costs. Total R&D costs of an R&D project are the 
necessary amount of R&D cost to accomplish the technical objective of the project. Because 
R&D activities will be continued until the technical objective is fulfilled, the amount of total 
R&D costs often is allocated to several periods. Cumulative R&D costs will be equal to total 
R&D costs when the technical objective is achieved. 
4.2.4 Returns on total R&D costs  
Returns on total R&D costs (hereafter returns on R&D) of an R&D project are returns 
created from the technical output of R&D activities in each accounting period. The amount of 
returns can be determined according to the objective of the project. For example, when the 
objective of the project is to create a new product to increase sales revenue, the amount of 
returns will be equal to sales revenues from selling the product substract any necessary 
expenses, such as costs of goods sold and advertising expense, in each accounting period. 
When the objective of the project is to apply the technical result from R&D activities to the 
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production process so that the production lead time can be reduced, the amount of returns 
will be equal to the savings of production costs from the shortened lead time.  
Returns on R&D will be generated only after R&D projects are technically finished. 
There are no returns generated during the process of R&D activities until the technical 
objective is accomplished and the technical output is created. Returns on R&D will continue 
to be generated and cumulated until the commercial objective of the project is fulfilled.  
4.2.5 The net benefit of R&D    
The net benefit of R&D (or the net benefit of an R&D project) is the net financial 
benefit created from an R&D project. It is the difference between cumulative returns on R&D 
substract cumulative R&D costs. Before the technical objective is fulfilled, the net benefit of 
the project is negative and is equal to the amount of cumulative R&D costs. The R&D project 
is breakeven when the cumulative R&D costs equal to the cumulative returns on R&D (i.e. 
the net benefit equals to zero). Total net benefits of an R&D project equal to total returns on 
R&D substract total R&D costs. The relationship between returns on R&D and the net 
benefit of R&D is depicted in Figure 7-1.  
(Insert Figure 7-1 about here) 
4.2.6 Information about the net benefit of R&D 
Information about the net benefit of R&D includes the expected net benefit (ENB), and 
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the cumulative realized net benefit (CRNB). ENB is managers’ ex ante expectations about 
the total net benefit of R&D that will be realized in the future. It equals to the present value 
of expected total returns on R&D substract expected total R&D costs. The expectation is 
based on implicit future plans that a firm is assumed to have made about its R&D activities. 
Because it is difficult to estimate the net benefit of R&D perfectly ex ante, the ENB is subject 
to change. Different underlying assumptions and analysis tools can be applied to obtain the 
expectation as long as the uncertainty involved in R&D activities are appropriately 
considered18.
The CRNB equals to cumulative realized returns on R&D substract cumulative R&D 
costs. It is the realization of the ENB. The difference between the CRNB and the ENB is the 
unrealized net benefit. Before the realization of any net benefit, the ENB is the total amount 
of unrealized net benefit that is expected to be realized in the future. The unrealized net 
benefit becomes realized as time passes by. When all unrealized net benefits become realized, 
there will be no difference between the ENB and the CRNB. In other words, when there are 
 
18 Important underlying assumptions that affect the ENB include, for example, probability of success (both 
technical and commercial), time-to-completion, time-to-commercialize, product life cycle, discount factors, 
available resources to conduct R&D activities, technical competitive advantages, market demands and the 
condition of the economy. These assumptions may differ from firm to firm and are subject to change. 
Meanwhile, different analysis tools can assist managers in deriving the ENB. For example, discounted cash 
flow valuation method and Real-Option methods are two popular analysis methods in valuing future opportunity. 
Capital assets pricing model may be applied to determine the appropriate discount factor. The selection of 
analysis tools depends on situation and management’s preference. It does not matter when firms apply different 
assumptions and analysis tools in deriving the ENB. As long as the expectation is reasonable, how management 
derives the expectation is not a concern in the reporting system. 
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no more benefits or costs to be realized in the future, the ENB is fully realized and reflected 
in the CRNB. The relationship between the total net benefit, the CRNB, and the unrealized 
net benefit can be observed from Figure 7-2.  
(Insert Figure 7-2 about here) 
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Chapter 5: The target reporting system  
 
In the target reporting system, information about the future net benefit of R&D as 
well as the realized net benefit of R&D will be organized and disclosed in three levels 
according to the degree of information aggregation. In the first level, information about the 
net benefit of R&D of each R&D project will be disclosed separately. Information from the 
first level will then be aggregated into the second level according to the age of each project. 
Information regarding net benefits of all R&D projects will be aggregated in the third level. 
Because the target reporting system is designed as a prototype of a desired R&D reporting 
practice, some modifications may have to be made when the reporting requirements are 
implemented in practice. Three possible modifications will be addressed after the 
introduction of the proposed reporting requirements. Potential benefits if the target reporting 
system can be implemented successfully will be discussed at the end of this chapter. A 
fictitious example is give in Appendix B to illustrate the implementation of the target 
reporting system more realisticly.  
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5.1 Level 1—information of individual R&D project  
5.1.1 General reporting requirements 
In level 1, firms will be required to report the ENB and the CRNB for each individual 
R&D project. As mentioned earlier, both past and current reports will be disclosed. Figure 8 
illustrates the disclosure for an R&D project at time t. For illustration purpose, only patterns 
are depicted without specifying any numbers. Line A in Figure 8 depicts the pattern of the 
reported ENB since the launch of the project. Each point in line A represents the reported 
ENB at each reporting date. Line B depicts the pattern of the reported CRNB since the launch 
of the project. Each point in line B represents the amount of CRNB at each reporting date. 
Other information can be added to support line A and line B if viewed necessary. For instance, 
line C in Figure 8 depicts the cumulative R&D costs. It becomes flat when there are no more 
R&D activities. The gap between line B and line C represents cumulative returns on R&D. 
(Insert Figure 8 about here) 
Several significant events related to the R&D project can be observed from Figure 8. 
First, it can be observed that the R&D project was technically finished at time t-n-m. Since 
the returns on R&D can be realized only after the technical accomplishment, the CRNB will 
be more and more negative as more R&D costs are cumulated. The upward trend of line B 
after time t-n-m indicates that there were realized returns on R&D, which happens only after 
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the technical objective is accomplished. The observation that line C is flat after t-n-m also 
indicates the technical accomplishment. Because more and more returns on R&D were 
realized after time t-n-m, the gap between line B and line C becomes wider and wider. 
Second, the R&D project broke even at time t-n. A project breaks even when the realized 
returns on R&D equal to total R&D costs, which makes the CRNB equal to zero. Since the 
CRNB equals to zero at time t-n, it is known that the project broke even at that time. Third, 
the distance between line A and line B represents the amount of unrealized net benefit. The 
amount of unrealized net benefit becomes less and less when more and more returns on R&D 
become realized. Because the returns on R&D become realized after time t-n-m, the gap 
between line A and line B narrows after that point of time. 
When the ENB is fully realized, line A and line B will meet each other. When no 
more returns are expected to be realized in the future, both lines will stop at the intersection. 
Each R&D project will either end up with a gain (i.e. positive net benefits) or a loss (i.e. 
negative net benefits). Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2 demonstrate the disclosures when the R&D 
project ends ups with a gain and when it ends up with a loss respectively. When both the 
technical and the commercial objectives of an R&D project are accomplished successfully, 
the project generally will end up with a positive amount of net benefit as shown in Figure 8-1. 
On the contrary, when either the technical or the commercial objective of an R&D project 
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cannot be fully fulfilled, the amount of unrealized net benefit will have to be wiped out. In 
this case, it is often that the CRNB is negative. Figure 8-2 provides an illustration when the 
project ends up with a loss. The drop of the expected net benefit reflects the fact that it is less 
likely for the unrealized net benefit to be realized in the future. The net benefit of the project 
will be equal to the amount of CRNB at that time. 
(Insert Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2 about here) 
5.1.2 The implications of reporting historical information 
As illustrated in chapter 3, different reporting behaviors will result in different 
realized precisions and in turn will affect the valuation of other projects. Historical 
information is proposed to be presented diagrammatically so that managers’ reporting 
behaviors can be observed clearly. Figure 9 depicts five possible patterns of the reported 
ENB that information users may observe. The reported ENB in case 1 has an increasing trend, 
which indicates that the expectation of the project’s net benefit has been revising upward 
over time. A convex pattern can be observed from case 2 which indicates that there was a 
period of time that the expectation of the project’s net benefit was getting worse but later on 
it was revised back. Case 3 shows a mobile pattern. It indicates that management has 
frequently revised its expectation in the past. Case 4 has a pattern similar to line A in Figure 8. 
The past peak suggests that the current expectation of the project’s net benefit is no longer as 
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good as before. Finally, the flat pattern in case 5 indicates that management has never 
changed its expectation.  
(Insert Figure 9 about here) 
 Because no one could perfectly foresee the uncertainty, management’s expectation is 
subject to change. As long as the updates from management reflect the underlying change of 
the uncertainty, they become informative signals. However, since market participants cannot 
tell how precise management’s expectation is before the realization of its expectation, they 
can only judge the quality of information indirectly by comparing the patterns among 
different R&D projects. For instance, if there was always a peak in the history of different 
R&D projects at different time points, it is likely that management is used to making 
over-optimistic expectations at the early stages of R&D. But if the peaks appeared at the 
same time for all projects, it is more likely that the updates reflect the change of economy 
condition that affects all projects. Furthermore, if management keeps updating its expectation 
upward but the realization of net benefit has never been significant, the credibility of the 
optimistic expectation also becomes suspicious. Therefore, such reporting strategy cannot be 
sustained in equilibrium. 
It is not reasonable to require any manager to provide perfect expectation; however, 
the frequency and the amount of change of expectation that can be observed from reports of 
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different projects, when putting together, will reveal a manager’s ability to handle the 
uncertainty. In the presence of similar level of uncertainty and profitability, if one firm 
manages the uncertainty better than the other, market participants will prefer using the report 
from the former to the latter. In equilibrium, the reports provided by incompetent 
management will not be used. As a result, reports from incompetent managers will have no 
impact on the market’s valuation and there will be no benefits for those firms to provide 
mandatory information. After considering the result, rational managers will be induced to 
improve their abilities to handle the uncertainty under the requirement of disclosing their past 
reports.     
 
5.2 Level 2—information of classified R&D projects 
Firms often have more than one R&D project at the same time. The first level in the 
target reporting system provides information about the net benefit of each individual R&D 
project but it does not provide links among different R&D projects within a firm. Further, it 
is hard to compare information about the net benefit of R&D across different firms without 
certain benchmarks. In the second level of the target reporting system, each R&D project will 
be classified to an age group according to the age of the project. The age of an R&D project 
is defined as the number of years since the project’s launch. Information about the net benefit 
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of each R&D project will then be aggregated in each age group. The longer a project has 
been undertaken the older the project is. The age is adopted as the classification benchmark 
because it is an objective measure that can be easily understood and applied, and it captures 
the long-term feature of R&D.  
Information users can compare the amount of ENB and the amount of CRNB from 
one age group with that from another age group. Similarly, information users can compare 
information from the same age group across different firms. Generally speaking, given the 
same amount of CRNB, younger projects are preferred to older projects because it takes 
shorter time for the net benefit of younger project to be realized. Similarly, given the age, 
projects with the largest CRNB are preferred. After information is classified, the information 
comparability will be improved. 
 Two types of disclosures will be required in the second level. First, a disclosure 
similar to the disclosure in the first level will be prepared for each age group. For Age 1 
group, there will be one point for the ENB and one point for the CRNB. There will not be a 
trend for Age 1 group since it only has information for one period. For Age 2 group, there 
will be two points for the ENB and two points for the CRNB so that a two-period trend can 
be observed. For Age t group, a pattern similar to Figure 7 can be observed. Examples are 
provided in Figure B-2 in Appendix B. 
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Second, a static diagram, which presents the status of the ENB and the CRNB from 
each age group at the reporting date, will be required. Figure 10 is given as an example. At 
the end of 2003, all R&D projects in a firm are classified into six age groups. The oldest 
projects were launched six years ago while the youngest projects were launched just one year 
ago. Three general observations can be seen from Figure 10. First, projects in Age 5 and Age 
6 groups are finished both technically and commercially because the ENB equals to the 
CRNB in both age groups. Second, projects in Age 4 group are approaching the breakeven 
point since the CRNB in this group is close to zero. Finally, projects in Age 3 group have the 
largest amount of unrealized net benefit which indicates that the firm has spent a lot on those 
R&D projects but has not received significant returns. For more examples, see Figure B-3 in 
Appendix B. 
(Insert Figure 10 about here) 
Because information will be reported and organized according to ages of R&D projects, 
the information comparability is enhanced. Market participants are able to compare 
information among each age group across firms. For instance, it is expected that more 
positive CRNB can be observed from older R&D projects in general. The market’s valuations 
of R&D projects from same age groups will be lower for those with smaller or more negative 
amounts of CRNB. It is also expected that younger projects will have more negative CRNB 
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because it takes time to accomplish the technical objectives. The market will realize that the 
negative CRNB is not due to bad performances but is due to the fact that younger projects are 
still under development. The valuation will be less biased accordingly.    
 
5.3 Level 3--aggregate R&D information 
Information about the net benefit of R&D from all R&D projects will be aggregated 
in level 3. General reporting requirements are first discussed and one adjustment to highlight 
management’s change of expectation is then examined. Two sets of financial ratios that make 
use of aggregate R&D information are developed for the application of aggregate R&D 
information. 
5.3.1 General reporting requirements 
The amount of ENB and the amount of CRNB from all R&D projects are aggregated in 
the third level. At time t, the aggregate ENB (CRNB) is the sum of the ENB (CRNB) from all 
R&D projects at time t. Similarly, the aggregate ENB (CRNB) at time t-1 is the sum of the 
ENB (CRNB) from all ongoing R&D projects at time t-1 and so forth. 
(Insert Figure 11 about here) 
Figure 11 is given for illustration purpose. Line A in Figure 11 depicts the aggregate 
ENB and line B depicts the aggregate CRNB. Compare to line B in Figure 8, line B in Figure 
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11 is less convex because the increase of the CRNB from one project could be offset by the 
decrease of that from another project. The gap between line A and line B represents the 
aggregate unrealized net benefit. Unlike the disclosure for individual project, there will not 
be an intersection of line A and line B in Figure 11 unless the firm stops undertaking any 
R&D project. In other words, as long as there are new-launched R&D projects there will be 
unrealized net benefits. Further, when an R&D project is discontinued, there will be a drop of 
line A. Line B will not be affected by the discontinued project. When a project is 
discontinued, the aggregate unrealized net benefit will decrease because the unrealized net 
benefit of the discontinued project will no longer have chance to be realized and is needed to 
be wiped out. Other related information can be added to support line A and line B. For 
instance, line C in Figure 11 depicts the aggregate cumulative R&D costs. The gap between 
line B and line C equals to aggregate returns on R&D. 
5.3.2 The impact of management’s change of expectation 
The trend of the aggregate ENB as depicted in line A in Figure 11 will be affected 
when management changes its expectation, launches new projects, or discontinues existing 
projects. Impacts from different sources will offset each other after the aggregation. For 
example, the upward adjustment of the ENB from one project will be offset by the downward 
adjustment of that from other projects. Moreover, impacts of launching or discontinuing 
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R&D projects will offset each other. The aggregate ENB will be adjusted upward (downward) 
by the amount of the ENB from the new-launched (discontinued) project. The continuous 
launching (discontinuing) of projects in each period results in an increasing (decreasing) 
trend of the aggregate ENB. When the amount of ENB from new projects equals to that from 
discontinued projects the impacts on the aggregate ENB will be offset. Finally, the impact of 
change of expectation will be offset by the impact of launching or discontinuing R&D 
projects. When one impact is greater than the other, the direction of the aggregate trend will 
be dominated by the greater one. 
 The impact of management’s change of expectation is of concern because if 
management intends to mislead investors, the cost related to the change of reported 
expectation will be less than the cost related to launching or discontinuing projects. Therefore, 
it is more likely that management manipulates information users’ expectations by changing 
the reported ENB. To highlight this possibility, the impact of management’s change of 
expectations is separated from the impact of launching or discontinuing projects.  
Line D is added in Figure 11 to separate the impact of management’s change of 
expectations. It depicts the trend of the aggregate ENB after excluding the impact of the 
change of expectation. In other words, line D will only be affected by impacts of launching 
or discontinuing projects. Line D in Figure 11 has a slightly increasing trend, which indicates 
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that, on average, the impact of launching projects is greater than that of discontinuing 
projects. The distance between line A and line D captures the impact of the change of 
expectation. By observing the gap between line A and line D, market participants can learn 
how much management has changed its expectation since the very first R&D project was 
launched. In Figure 11, the gap between line A and line D widens. This suggests that 
management has been adjusting its expectation upward. When there is no change of 
expectation, line A will overlap line D (see the example in Figure B-4). 
5.3.3 An application of aggregate R&D information—financial analysis 
Similar to financial analysis that assess firms’ viability, stability, and profitability 
using financial ratios, aggregate R&D financial information can be further analyzed by using 
simple financial ratios. Two sets of ratios are developed to assist information users in 
utilizing reported aggregate R&D information. The first set of ratios is designed to measure 
how fast management’s expectation has been realized in the past. The second set of ratios is 
designed to measure how long it takes for the rest of expectation to be realized.  Table 4 
provides a summary of the definition of each ratio. An example is given below to show how 
these ratios will be useful in assisting the evaluation of R&D performance and improving the 
comparability of information.  
(Insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here)
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Consider a situation when an investor evaluates two firms’ R&D activities. 
Aggregate R&D information of each firm is provided in Table 5. It can be seen that the two 
firms have the same amount of aggregate ENB and aggregate CRNB. It seems that there is no 
difference of the profitability of R&D projects between these two firms by comparing the 
amount of ENB and CRNB of each firm. However, when analyzing the ratios, it can be seen 
that the rate of net benefit realization of firm 2 is faster so that time to fulfill unrealized net 
benefit is shorter. Because investors prefer the uncertainty being resolved faster in general19,
the faster management’s expectation is realized the better. It is reasonable to expect that the 
valuation of firm 2’s R&D activities will be assessed better. From this example, it can be seen 
that the valuation of R&D activities and the information comparability can be improved 
when applying these ratios. 
 
5.4 Possible modifications 
The target reporting system is designed as a prototype of the desirable R&D reporting 
system. Hence, potential problems that may incur when implementing the target reporting 
system in practice should be considered. Three possible modifications of the implementation 
 
19 Fore example, Gandhi et al. [1989] suggest that investors are better off with the early resolution of 
uncertainty because they can arrange their consumption and investment to maximize their utilities if the 
uncertainty resolves early. 
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of the proposed reporting requirements are considered accordingly.  
First, the requirement of disclosing historical information may need to be modified 
when the reporting requirements are implemented in practice. Under the going concern 
assumption, firms will have a long life. The requirement of reporting all past reports may not 
be feasible under the going concern assumption because information could be affected by 
other exogenous factors, such as the impact of economy cycle, in the long run. Some bounds 
may be needed in order to set up the limit of the length of the required history when 
implementing the system in practice.   
Second, the requirement of disclosing information for each R&D project separately in 
level 1 is likely to produce a long disclosure. When a firm has a lot of R&D projects, a great 
many of the disclosures will be obtained in level 1. Too many disclosures may not generate 
sound effects. Instead, it will be difficult for information users to get the most useful 
information they need. Therefore, the requirement of disclosing information of individual 
R&D project can be modified by the principle of materiality. Information about the net 
benefit of more significant projects (e.g. those with greater scale or larger impact) will still be 
disclosed separately. However, information about the net benefit of less significant projects 
can be grouped and reported in one disclosure. Such adjustment is similar to the disclosure of 
segment information. It is believed that the implementation of the target system in such way 
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will be more feasible. 
Finally, there are three levels in the target reporting system. Although it is ideal if 
information with different degrees of aggregation can be presented at the same time, whether 
disclosures from all levels are necessary to be reported will need to be considered further. For 
example, when there is only one R&D project, information in each level has no difference 
and only one disclosure is needed. Moreover, when there is a high degree of heterogeneity 
among R&D projects, separate disclosures of each R&D project could be more useful than 
providing aggregate information. Hence, it may not be necessary that information will be 
reported in all three levels when implementing the reporting system in practice. 
 
5.5 Potential benefits of implementing the target reporting system 
The main purpose of designing the target reporting system is to improve the valuation 
of R&D and to reduce the opportunistic R&D decision making. It is often true that a firm’s 
future cash flows are highly associated with the net benefit flow of R&D; therefore, the 
market price of the firm will be closely related to the valuation of R&D. If the target 
reporting system can be implemented successfully, market participants can directly assess 
future net benefit flows of R&D and price the firm more appropriately. Since the market 
price will be determined after considering the future net benefit flow from R&D activities, 
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opportunistic R&D decisions that sacrifice long-term net benefits of R&D to meet short-term 
target will be no longer necessary. It is likely for firms to have such benefits after information 
about the future net benefit is disclosed.  
In addition to the above main benefits, there are other potential benefits following the 
implementation of the target reporting system. For example, information search costs about 
the value of R&D will be less than before. Because R&D activities have been important 
economic activities, there is a great demand for information related to R&D activities, 
especially the potential benefits created from R&D. Once the target reporting requirements 
are imposed, such information will be publicly available. The savings of information search 
costs can be great. Market participants will also be benefited from the lower uncertainty of 
investing in firms with R&D activities after more information about future cash flows are 
available.  
Moreover, managers will be encouraged to improve their ability to handle the 
uncertainty. Because the precision of managers’ reports will be observed by the market and 
the precision will depend on managers’ ability to foresee or manage the uncertainty, 
information provided by incompetent managers will not be used in equilibrium. 
Consequently, managers will have to be involved in R&D decision making processes earlier 
and more intensively to learn more information about the uncertainty of R&D before issue 
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their reports. More deliberate decisions are expected and those firms with more competent 
managers will be benefited.  
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Chapter 6: The transitional reporting system 
 
Although the target reporting system has desirable features and can potentially 
benefit both market participants and firms if implemented successfully, it is expected that the 
progress of the transition of the reporting practice may not be made in single step. In this 
chapter, possible obstacles to the implementation of the target reporting requirements are 
briefly discussed. To overcome the obstacles and to initiate the transition process, a 
transitional reporting system is proposed and will be introduced following the discussion of 
possible obstacles.  
 
6.1 Possible obstacles 
Two main obstacles to the implementation of the target reporting system are expected. 
Both obstacles are related to the feasibility of the requirement of disclosing managers’ ex 
ante expectation of R&D net benefit. First, it is common that managers decide to launch 
R&D projects by their instincts without first quantifying potential net benefits. Such 
decisions could be made just to satisfy managers’ ideals without considering potential 
benefits in advance. Imprudent R&D decisions can still generate profits because it is evident 
that many innovations bring unexpected profits after they are created. There is no standard 
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process for managers to make their R&D investment decisions. However, when managers are 
used to making R&D-related decisions without deliberate plans, it will be difficult to require 
them to provide a reasonable figure of future net benefits of R&D. The quality of managers’ 
expectation could also be too low to be useful in this case.  
Second, it can be foreseen that managers will fight against disclosing the ENB of 
R&D projects. Although managers are protected from liability for forward-looking 
disclosures on projected performance or operations when certain conditions are met20 under 
the SEC’s safe harbor provision in the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, the great 
amount of uncertainty involved in R&D could still discourage managers from providing 
specific estimation. It is likely that the market will blame the imprecise information on 
mangers’ inability without recognizing the potential impact of uncertainty. Further, 
confidential information is possible to be refined from management’s expectation by 
competent competitors and proprietary costs will be inevitable. Hence, managers may be 
reluctant to provide information about the future net benefit of R&D.  
Because of these two potential obstacles, it may be difficult to implement the target 
reporting system, especially the requirement of disclosing the ENB in the short run. To 
 
20 Section 102 in the act indicates that if (i) the disclosure is accompanied by certain cautionary statements, or 
(ii) the plaintiff fails to prove that the disclosure was made with actual knowledge of its misleading nature, 
managers are protected from the liability for the forward-looking disclosures. 
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initiate the transition process, a transitional reporting system is developed and is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
6.2 The transitional reporting requirements 
The above obstacles suggest that it may not be easy to implement the target reporting 
system in the short run. It is also true that it will take time for the transition to be put into 
practice. However, the need for more R&D financial information is imperative and should be 
seriously considered. To overcome the obstacles and to initiate the transition, a transitional 
reporting system is developed as an initial step in the transition. As the first step in the 
transition, managers will only be required to report information about realized returns on 
R&D in the transitional reporting system. Because managers are no longer required to 
provide their expectation of future R&D net benefit, the reduced reporting obligation may 
improve the feasibility of the proposed transition.  
Information about the realized returns from past R&D activities is required because it 
provides evidence of the profitability of past R&D activities. In the absence of information 
about the future net benefit, such information is necessary to persuade market participants 
that current R&D activities have potential to create future financial benefits. In addition, 
market participants can predict future net benefits of R&D from the past realization. Even if 
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there is no direct information about future net benefits of R&D, the valuation of R&D can be 
made more appropriately when there is information about realized returns R&D than when 
there is only information about R&D costs. Information from the transitional reporting 
system will still be useful to a certain extent.   
The proposed disclosure in the transitional reporting system is illustrated in Figure 12. 
For each R&D project, managers will be required to report realized R&D costs and realized 
returns on R&D costs. Realized R&D costs are the cumulative amount of R&D costs that has 
been invested since the beginning of R&D activities. Realized returns on R&D costs are the 
cumulative amount of returns that has been generated since the end of R&D activities. 
Definitions of R&D costs and returns on R&D have been given in section 4.2.  
(Insert Figure 12 and Figure 13 about here) 
As shown in Figure 12, the technical objective of the project is accomplished at time t 
because there is no more R&D costs being invested after time t and the amount of cumulative 
R&D costs remains the same after t (i.e. the line becomes flat). Returns on R&D begin to be 
realized after t. At time t+n, cumulative realized returns equal to cumulative R&D costs (i.e. 
the net benefit of the R&D project equals to zero). After t+n, the net benefit of the project 
becomes to be greater than zero.   
Information from each individual R&D project can further be aggregated. An example 
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of the aggregate transitional disclosure is provided in Figure 13. For simplicity, both the 
aggregate cumulative R&D costs and the aggregate cumulative returns on R&D are assumed 
to be linear functions of time. The main difference between the aggregate disclosure and the 
individual disclosure is that the aggregate cumulative R&D costs will keep increasing as long 
as there are R&D activities going on. The amount of time needed for aggregate R&D 
activities to break even will depend on the functional forms of the aggregate cumulative 
R&D costs and the aggregate cumulative returns on R&D. 
It is believed that the transitional reporting system has more potential to be 
implemented in practice. The requirement does not ask managers to disclose any 
forward-looking information and the proprietary cost of disclosing realized information can 
be further limited. In addition, information about realized returns on R&D demonstrates that 
R&D activities are not valueless activities. The valuation of firms’ R&D activities can be 
made more appropriately when such information is provided. Because the proprietary cost of 
disclosure is limited and the valuation of R&D can be improved by the additional disclosure, 
it is likely that managers will be more willing to provide such information and will be less 
against to the implementation of the transitional reporting system. The transition of the 
reporting practice can potentially be initiated in the short run and the R&D reporting practice 
can move toward a more desirable reporting practice accordingly. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Currently, the R&D reporting practice is cost focused. Information about the net 
benefit of R&D is not widespread and the lack of such information exacerbates information 
asymmetry, which results in biased market valuation and opportunistic R&D decision 
makings. This study suggests that a transition of current reporting practice from cost focused 
to net benefit focused is necessary to reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry. A 
path of the transition beyond what has been considered by the previous literature is identified. 
A stream of two reporting systems, including the target reporting system and the transitional 
reporting system, outside financial statements is proposed for managers to provide more 
information about the net benefit of R&D to the market. It is expected that the transition can 
be made gradually along the path identified by this study and the negative impact of 
information asymmetry can be alleviated effectively.  
Because all past reports for each R&D project will be disclosed separately, 
managers, when making their reporting decisions, will be forced to consider benefits of the 
build-up credibility by providing more precise information. In equilibrium, information with 
an optimal level of precision will be provided. Quality of managers’ reports can be ensured to 
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a certain extent and market participants will be benefited from having more useful 
information in their decision makings. Firms will also be benefited by receiving the 
maximum amount of net benefit of providing required information. Although there will be 
obstacles to the implementation of the proposed reporting systems in the short run, the 
proposed path of the transition is worth to be considered because both the market and the 
firms will potentially be benefited.  
The main contributions of this study are as follows. First, this study explicitly points 
out the need of the transition of the R&D reporting practice and it also specifies a new path 
for the transition to take place. The direct disclosure of information about the net benefit of 
R&D is considered as one potential way to alleviate possible negative impacts of information 
asymmetry. It is our understanding that this study is the first accounting study which 
seriously considers the direct disclosure of net benefit of R&D as a potential approach to 
transit the R&D reporting practice and to mitigate negative impacts of information 
asymmetry. This study also gives accounting regulators insights into the improvement of the 
R&D reporting practice beyond what has been provided in the prior literature. 
Second, a stream of two reporting systems along the path of the transition is 
established. The target reporting system is designed as an avenue for managers to provide 
information that can be directly associated to market valuation (i.e. the future net benefit of 
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R&D). Although it has less potential to be implemented in the short run, the target reporting 
system provides a prototype of the desirable reporting practice. On the other hand, the 
transitional reporting system is designed to have more potential to be implemented in the 
short run. It acts as a cushion to the impact of the transition on both the market and the firms. 
The progress of the transition is expected to be made gradually with the implementation of 
the transitional reporting system initially. It is believed that the current R&D reporting 
practice can be improved smoothly toward the desirable R&D reporting practice eventually 
following the established stream.  
Finally, this study points out that there will be potential net benefits by transiting the 
reporting practice along the suggested path. The valuation of R&D will be less biased and the 
incentive for opportunistic R&D decision makings will be reduced. In addition to the 
alleviated negative impacts of information asymmetry, some other potential benefits, such as 
the lower information search costs, the better R&D decision making process, and the 
reduction of the perceived risk, have also been identified. Those potential benefits suggest 
that the transition will benefit not only market participants but also firms.  
There are several limitations of this research. First, the proposed reporting system is 
designed with an attempt to minimize the proprietary cost from disclosing proprietary 
information. However, other potential costs, such as auditing costs and potential litigation 
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costs, are not considered in the design. Further, the potential impact from introducing a new 
reporting system on social welfare is not addressed. The neglect of those potential costs is not 
because they are not important but because they are outside the focus of this research. It will 
be interesting to consider the impact of those potential costs in the future. Second, the 
proposed reporting system cannot perfectly prevent managers from misreporting. Only the 
incentive for misreporting is reduced and a reasonable degree of precision can be maintained. 
This limitation is due to the uncertainty of future events and is inevitable when requiring 
forward-looking information from anyone. Finally, only a few practical concerns and 
obstacles have been considered in this study. It is possible that there are other practical issues 
related to the implementation of the reporting system that have not been addressed in this 
study.  
Because the proposed reporting systems have not been put into practice, in the 
absence of empirical evidence, whether the systems can work as effectively as expected 
remains as an open question. In the near future, one potential extension of this study is to 
examine the effectiveness of the proposed reporting systems by performing an accounting 
behavioral experiment. The experiment will be designed to examine managers’ reporting 
behaviors and the impact of managers’ reports on the valuation of R&D projects under the 
proposed reporting requirements. People participate in the experiment will be assigned to two 
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groups: those in an experimental group will be given financial statements and additional 
information from the proposed disclosures while those in a control group will be given 
financial statements only. In each group, people will be further divided into two subgroups: 
one will play the role of managers and the other will play the role of market participants. The 
impacts of the proposed disclosure can be observed by comparing the reporting behaviors 
and the valuation of R&D between two groups. Such a setting can provide an initial evidence 
of the feasibility of the reporting systems and can provide more policy implications about the 
improvement of the R&D reporting practice.   
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Appendix A: Examples of current R&D reporting practice 
 
1. Information from annual reports 
 Source: Annual report 2005 from 3M  
(see http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/MMM/reports/2005ar.pdf )
(1) Information in MD&A  
“Research, development, and related expenses as a percent of sales were flat when 
comparing 2005 to 2004. However, spending in dollars increased approximately 4%, reflecting 
3M’s continuing commitment to fund future growth for the Company.” 
 
(2) Information in significant accounting policy section 
“Research, development, and related expenses: These costs are charged to operations in the 
year incurred and are shown on a separate line of the Consolidated Statement of Income. 
Research and development expenses, covering basic scientific research and the application of 
scientific advances to the development or new and improved products and their uses, totaled $798 
million in 2005, $759 million in 2004 and $749 million in 2003. Related expenses primarily 
include technical support provided to customers for existing products by 3M laboratories and 
internally developed patent costs, which include costs and fees incurred to prepare, file, secure 
and maintain patents.”     
 
2. Information from conference calls 
a. Information about expected R&D cost 
“With lower projected revenue in our fourth quarter, we are taking measures to keep 
operating expenses in line and expect them to be comparable or slightly down from the third quarter. 
SG&A expenses are expected to be between $10.3 million and $10.8 million and R&D is expected 
to be between $6.3 million to $6.6 million.”  
Source: “Q3 2006 Martek Biosciences Corporation Earnings Conference Call – Final”, 
Voxant FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, 09/06/2006.  
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b. Information about R&D physical progress  
“…there's several studies going on and we don't expect any results, there won't be 
any results this year. There may not be any results next year. These are 6 to 12 month 
studies and yes, so 2008 I would say we're going to start to see some results.  
Source: “Q3 2006 Martek Biosciences Corporation Earnings Conference Call – Final”, 
Voxant FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, 09/06/2006. 
c. Information about R&D cost reimbursement 
“Applying this metric to Nastech in 2004, we had reimbursement revenue of $1 
million, or about 5% of our R&D expenses. For 2005, this revenue increased to $3.5 
million, which represented 12% of R&D expenses. Year-to-date for 2006 we have, in fact, 
recognized revenue of over $9 million, which is approximately 30% of our R&D 
expenses.  
Over the last two years, not only has reimbursement revenue increased over 
nine-fold, but the increase in revenue has significantly outpaced our R&D costs. While 
we expect substantial quarter-to-quarter and year-over-year fluctuation of this metric, we 
see this progress as an outstanding accomplishment. “ 
Source: “Q3 2006 Nastech Pharmaceutical Earnings Presentation – Final”, Voxant FD 
(FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, 11/01/2006. 
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Appendix B: An example of the implementation of the target 
reporting System 
In this fictitious example, a firm is assumed to begin its R&D activities seven years 
ago and it has four R&D projects ongoing and one discontinued project at the end of year 
2005 (current accounting year). Some of them were launched at the same time while some 
not. The titles of the projects are anonymous so that only financial numbers are observed. 
 
Level 1. Individual R&D project 
For an individual project, information about the net benefit is first summarized in 
separate tables. For example, the firm has gathered the following information about the net 
benefit of project A and organized it in Table B-1. 
(Insert Table B-1 about here) 
After preparing information of each R&D project, information of every R&D project 
is further summarized in Table B-2 to be used in making the diagram. The disclosure of 
information about the net benefit of each project is then presented through diagrams as 
shown Figure B-1. 
(Insert Table B-2 and Figure B-1 about here) 
Several observations can be seen from Figure B-1: (1) It takes more time for project A 
(about three years) to bring benefits than project B, C, and D; (2) The amount of unrealized 
net benefit for project A,B and C is quite small which suggests that the expected net benefit 
for these three projects has almost been fulfilled; (3) Project A, C, and D consistently brings 
benefits to the firm; (4) Project B brings more profits in early years but the contribution is 
getting smaller. Management expected the prospects of project B was good one year earlier 
but revised it downward probably because of the smaller amount of realized net benefit; (5) 
Lines for the CRNB and the ENB for project E have intersected, which indicates that no 
more net benefit is going to be realized. Further, the significant drop of the ENB suggests that 
there was a loss of the project probably due to the failure to achieve either technical or 
commercial objective so that the firm withdrew (or discontinued) the product; (6) Project F 
began just one year ago. Thus, the CRNB is negative and the distance between the ENB and 
the CRNB for project F is the greatest at the end of year 2005.      
 
Level 2. Classified R&D Projects 
To provide a more general picture of R&D activities, projects with the same age are 
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grouped. Table B-3 shows summarized information in the classified project level. Ages of the 
firm’s R&D project range from 2 to 7. For Age 7 and Age 2 groups, the classified information 
is the same as individual project’s report because only one project in each age group. Each of 
Age 4 group and Age 6 group includes two R&D projects. Based on summarized information, 
each group will have its own diagram as shown in Figure B-2. Two observations can be seen 
from Figure B-2: First, it takes the shortest time (2 and half years) for R&D projects in Age 6 
group to break even. Second, there is a significant decreasing trend for Age 4 group largely 
due to the failure of project E. 
(Insert Table B-3 and Figure B-2 about here) 
To show further the difference among each group, a static diagram which shows 
information from all age group at the same time is prepared. Figure B-3 is the reported static 
diagram. Two observations can be seen from Figure B-3: First, the ENB for Age 6 and 7 
groups are almost fulfilled. Second, the youngest project is still under development hence the 
realized net benefit is negative. 
 
Level 3. Aggregate R&D Project 
Table B-4 summarizes aggregate information of all R&D projects in the firm. The 
aggregate ENB (CRNB) in each year equals to the sum of ENB (CRNB) from all ongoing 
R&D projects in each year. To distinguish the impact from changing of expectation, the 
initial ENB (the first estimate made when each R&D project was launched) for each R&D 
project is kept. The difference between the initial ENB and the current ENB is the 
accumulated amount of change of expectation. Figure B-4 shows the disclosure of aggregate 
R&D activities. Three things can be observed from the figure. First, overall R&D activities in 
the firm has achieved breakeven in year 2004. Second, the firm did not change its expectation 
frequently over the years so that the aggregate initial ENB almost overlaps the aggregate 
ENB. Third, in 2005, there is a significant downward change, which is due to the write-off of 
project E. 
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Figure 2  Potential paths of the transition of the R&D reporting practice 
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Figure 3  Timeline of the events in the theoretical example  
 
Figure 4  Realized precision following different reporting behaviors 
t=0 t=1 t=2 
1y is observed 
Project 1 begins 
1r is issued 
2y is observed 
Project 2 begins 
2x is realized 
t=3 
1x is realized 
2r is issued 
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Figure 5  Costs and benefits of providing required information  
 


















Figure 7-1  Returns on R&D and net benefits of R&D 
Figure 7-2  Realized net benefits and unrealized net benefits 
Cumulative R&D costs


























C: Realized R&D cost 
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Figure 10  Level 2: Static diagram at the end of 2003 
 
Figure 11  Level 3: Aggregate R&D financial information 
 
Notation 
A: Aggregate ENB 
B: Aggregate CRNB 
C: Aggregate cumulative realized R&D cost  
































Figure 12  The disclosure for an R&D project- transitional reporting system 
 
Figure 13  The disclosure of aggregate R&D information- transitional reporting system 
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A: Classified ENB 
B: Classified CRNB 
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Figure B-3  The disclosure of static diagram-target reporting system  















Figure B-4  The disclosure of aggregate R&D information-target reporting system  













Table 1  Impacts of R&D information on expected future earnings 
 Current realized  
earnings at t
Future expected  
earnings at t
Scenario 1. No increase of R&D cost. 
Earnings before R&D $100 $100 
R&D expense  ( 20) (20)
Earnings  $ 80 $ 80 
 Scenario 2. Increase $10 in R&D cost without additional R&D 
Earnings before R&D $100 $100 
R&D expense  (30) (30)
Earnings  $70 $ 70 
 Scenario 3. Increase $10 in R&D cost with additional R&D information 
Earnings before R&D $100 $130 
R&D expense  (30) (30)
Earnings  $ 70 $100 
 
Table 2  Updated perceived precision levels 
 Updated perceived precision level   





c=0.3 c=0.5 c=0.7 c=0.3 c=0.5 c=0.7 
1-1 0.0018 0.0012 0.0014 0.0015 0.0040 0.0034 0.0047
1-2 0.0050 0.0022 0.0030 0.0038 0.0050 0.0050 0.0070
1-3 0.0066 0.0027 0.0038 0.0049 0.0055 0.0058 0.0081
1-4 0.0024 0.0014 0.0017 0.0020 0.0042 0.0037 0.0052
2-1 0.0066 0.0027 0.0038 0.0049 0.0055 0.0058 0.0081
2-2 4.0000 1.2007 2.0005 2.8003 1.2035 2.0025 2.8035
2-3 4.0000 1.2007 2.0005 2.8003 1.2035 2.0025 2.8035
2-4 0.0062 0.0026 0.0036 0.0047 0.0054 0.0056 0.0079
3-1 0.0024 0.0014 0.0017 0.0020 0.0042 0.0037 0.0052
3-2 0.0062 0.0026 0.0036 0.0047 0.0054 0.0056 0.0079
3-3 0.0046 0.0021 0.0028 0.0035 0.0049 0.0048 0.0067
3-4 0.0017 0.0012 0.0014 0.0015 0.0040 0.0034 0.0047
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Table 3  The market valuation based on the updated precision levels 
 The market valuation  
Reporting 
behavior 
Scenario 1: 0ρ =0.001 Scenario 2: 0ρ =0.005 
c=0.3 c=0.5 c=0.7 c=0.3 c=0.5 c=0.7 
1-1 114.11 115.39 116.58 128.39 126.22 130.38
1-2 120.76 124.65 127.63 131.00 130.99 134.79
1-3 123.19 127.59 130.75 132.05 132.69 136.30
1-4 115.61 117.65 119.47 128.95 127.31 131.42
2-1 123.19 127.59 130.75 132.05 132.69 136.30
2-2 149.87 149.92 149.95 149.87 149.92 149.95
2-3 149.87 149.92 149.95 149.87 149.92 149.95
2-4 122.70 127.01 130.15 131.83 132.35 136.00
3-1 115.61 117.65 119.47 128.95 127.31 131.42
3-2 122.70 127.01 130.15 131.83 132.35 136.00
3-3 120.10 123.82 126.71 130.72 130.53 134.37
3-4 113.91 115.09 116.19 128.32 126.08 130.25
Table 4  Summary of financial ratios using aggregate R&D information 
 
Ratios to measure the speed 
Rate of cost reimbursement= % of cost reimbursed/time elapsed  
Rate of benefit realization= % of RB/time elapsed 
Rate of net benefit realization=% of RNB/time elapsed 
Ratios to measure the time 
Time to break even= (1-% of cost reimbursed)/ rate of cost reimbursement 
Time to fulfill unrealized benefit= (1-% of RB)/rate of benefit realization 
Time to fulfill unrealized net benefit = (1-% of RNB)/rate of net benefit realization 
where % of cost reimbursed=aggregate CRB/aggregate CRC 
 time elapsed = the number of years elapsed sine the first launch of R&D activities 
 % of RB= aggregate CRB/ aggregate TEB 
 % of RNB= aggregate CRNB/ aggregate ENB 
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Table 5  The application of R&D financial ratios 
 Firm 1 Firm 2
Aggregate expected net benefit $ 200  $ 200 
Aggregate cumulative realized net benefit $ 50  $ 50 
Rate for net benefit realization 8% 15% 
Number of years to fulfill unrealized net benefit 16 8
Table B-1  Financial information of an R&D project 
 Project A 
Expected and Realized Net Benefit   
(in thousand dollar)   At the End of Year  
Item Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 
Expected net benefit       
1 Total Expected benefit $1,360 $1,230 $1,240 $1,240 $1,230 $1,220 $1,200
2 Total Expected cost 740 700 690 690 690 700 700
3=1-2 Expected net benefit $620 $589 $550 $550 $540 $520 $500
Realized net benefit       
4 Cumulative Realized benefit, B.B. $841 $426 $36 $0 $0 $0 $0
5 Current Realized benefit 370 415 390 36 0 0 0
6=4+5 Cumulative Realized benefit, E.B. $1,211 $841 $426 $36 $0 $0 $0
7 Cumulative Realized cost, B.B. $625 $565 $440 $320 $200 $100 $0
8 Current Realized cost 60 60 125 120 120 100 100
R&D cost 0 0 0 90 120 100 100
Non R&D cost 60 60 125 30 0 0 0
9=7-8 Cumulative Realized cost, E.B. $685 $625 $565 $440 $320 $200 $100
10=5-8 Current realized net benefit $310 $355 $265 -$84 -$120 -$100 -$100
11=6-9 Cumulative realized net benefit $526 $216 -$139 -$404 -$320 -$200 -$100
Unrealized net benefit       
12=1-6 Unrealized benefit $149 $389 $814 $1,204 $1,230 $1,220 $1,200
13=2-9 Unrealized cost 55 75 125 250 370 500 600
14=12-13 Unrealized net benefit $94 $373 $689 $954 $860 $720 $600
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Table B-2 Summary of ENB and CRNB of individual R&D project
Project A B C D E F
Year ENB CRNB ENB CRNB ENB CRNB ENB CRNB ENB CRNB ENB CRNB
2005 $620 $526 $192 $165 $339 $258 $638 $199 -$130 -$130 $387 -$316
2004 $589 $216 $230 $140 $335 $186 $645 -$67 $168 -$128 $387 -$158
2003 $550 -$139 $190 $96 $335 $62 $680 -$375 $190 -$83
2002 $550 -$404 $170 -$52 $330 -$68 $753 -$185 $248 -$43
2001 $540 -$320 $165 -$224 $300 -$208
2000 $520 -$200 $150 -$128 $300 -$198
1999 $500 -$100
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Table B-3 Summary of ENB and CRNB of classified R&D project
Project Age 2 Age 4 Age 6 Age 7
Year ENB CRNB ENB CRNB ENB CRNB ENB CRNB
2005 $387 -$316 $508 $69 $531 $423 $620 $526
2004 $387 -$158 $813 -$195 $565 $326 $589 $216
2003 $870 -$458 $525 $158 $550 -$139
2002 $1,001 -$228 $500 -$120 $550 -$404
2001 $465 -$432 $540 -$320
2000 $450 -$326 $520 -$200
1999 $500 -$100
Table B-4 Aggregate R&D financial information
Year 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
ENB $500 $970 $1,005 $2,051 $1,945 $2,354 $2,046
CRNB -$100 -$526 -$752 -$752 -$439 $189 $702
Initial ENB $500 $950 $950 $1,951 $1,951 $2,338 $2,338
Change of estimation $20 $55 $100 -$6 $16 -$292
